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3Foreword
Industry evolution research focuses on 
answering the key dilemma of the ﬁeld of 
strategic management, that is, what ma-
kes certain ﬁrms successful and others 
to fail, from an evolutionary perspective. 
The course Industry Evolution has been 
in the syllabus of the Department of In-
dustrial Engineering and Management 
at Aalto University / Helsinki Universi-
ty of Technology since 2005. The present 
publication comprises a selection of gra-
duate student course assignments from 
the Spring term of 2012 when the course 
was lectured jointly by the editors of the 
publication, Joonas Järvinen and Mir-
va Peltoniemi. The course was original-
ly established and lectured until 2010 by 
Prof. Juha-Antti Lamberg (currently at 
University of Jyväskylä). 
Due to increasing popularity of 
evolutionary perspective in strategic 
management and organizational rese-
arch, the main message of the course 
has been that an evolutionary view on in-
dustries and ﬁrms may offer important 
and complementary insights when it 
comes to understanding the above men-
tioned key dilemma in strategic manage-
ment. Thus, the general aim of the cour-
se has been to offer insights and frame-
works to analyze and understand such 
issues as survival, industry evolution, 
dethronement processes, the role of top 
management and business dynamics in 
general. The course has offered introduc-
tion to the most important streams of re-
search in industry evolution (i.e., evolu-
tionary economics, industry life cycle, 
and organizational ecology), practical 
insights from the evolution of several 
industries (such as pulp and paper, bio-
technology, video games, retailing, and 
electricity), and a hands-on experience 
on how to analyze evolution of a parti-
cular industry or group of ﬁrms.
An important part of the course has 
always been a demanding group assign-
ment in which students have been ex-
pected to analyze the evolution of a par-
ticular industry, organizational form or 
a ﬁrm by applying a theoretical perspec-
tive introduced during the course. With 
the aim of producing a publishable qua-
lity short empirical paper with practical 
managerial implications, students have 
ﬁrst chosen an empirical setting to ana-
lyze and then gathered empirical data, 
studied earlier research on the area of 
interest, conducted empirical analysis, 
presented their ﬁndings in a seminar, 
and constructively evaluated the fin-
dings produced by other groups. As a re-
sult of this process, this publication now 
includes a selection of the ﬁnal short re-
search papers from the spring 2012 cour-
se. Since all the studies are focused on 
industries with a high level of importan-
ce for future economic growth, we hope 
that publishing these interesting fin-
dings achieved through a considerab-
le amount of work may offer important 
insights for the future success of the stu-
died industries and ﬁrms.
The general theme for the course 
assignments this year was emergence, 
growth, and resurgence of industries and 
organizational forms. Potential research 
questions in the area were related to how 
4new industries emerge, what are the dri-
vers behind the emergence and growth of 
a particular industry, and why it is often 
seen that within old already concentra-
ted industries new ﬁrms start to emerge 
at some point of time. Considering that 
earlier research has offered limited ans-
wers to these highly important questions 
(e.g. Aldrich and Ruef, 2006), the theme 
offered highly interesting and challen-
ging opportunities for students. Rela-
ted to the theme, the following chapters 
present analyses of the emergence and 
evolution of hybrid cars, laser eye surge-
ry, and payday loan industries with dif-
fering interesting theoretical and prac-
tical insights. 
First, the study by Heiskanen et al. 
(2012) focuses on hybrid electric cars 
industry within the US with an aim to 
identify the stage of the HEV industry li-
fe cycle and provide insights of the ﬁrm 
success factors in the industry. By app-
lying industry life-cycle (ILC) theory, 
their ﬁndings imply that the develop-
ment of entry rates, ﬁrm density, sales 
volumes, prices, and innovativeness be-
have as the ILC theory predicts. In cont-
rast, the results also suggest that exit ra-
tes do not behave as expected. In the light 
of the ILC theory, they suggest that the 
HEV industry is in its emergent phase. 
The study also identiﬁes that early ent-
rance and innovativeness are key factors 
for ﬁrm survival.
 Second, Nieminen et al. (2012) stu-
dy the refractive laser eye surgery equip-
ment industry in the United States. They 
test the propositions of firm survival 
central to the industry life-cycle litera-
ture, i.e. the effects of entry timing, pre-
entry experience and innovativeness on 
ﬁrm survival. Moreover, they analyze the 
shift from product to process R&D pre-
dicted by the theory. They ﬁnd that pre-
entry experience and innovativeness 
improve the probability of ﬁrm survival, 
while early entry does not bring about 
such an advantage. Moreover, they ﬁnd 
that instead of a clear shift from product 
to process R&D there are cyclical trends. 
Third, Hiirsalmi et al. (2012) present 
a study with a focus on legitimacy of a 
payday loan industry in Finland. On the 
basis of earlier research, they ﬁrst sug-
gest that the legitimacy of an industry 
consists of 1) density-based; 2) regula-
tive legitimacy; and 3) social legitimacy. 
By applying this framework in the rese-
arch context, they then ﬁnd out that the 
most important legitimacy factor for the 
payday loan industry is regulative legiti-
macy, which can be comprehended as a 
perquisite for the other two legitimacies. 
Further, they suggest that with regulati-
ve legitimacy, an industry can grow and 
ﬂourish, even if social legitimacy is not 
that high. 
As a conclusion, we believe that the 
assignments offer interesting insights 
for both ﬁrms operating in the studied 
industries but also ﬁrms in industries 
experiencing similar kinds of dynamics 
and particularly management resear-
chers interested in evolutionary rese-
arch.
In Helsinki, Finland, and Vienna, Aust-
ria, May 2012,
Mirva Peltoniemi and Joonas Järvinen
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7Evolution of the Emerging  
US Hybrid Electric Vehicle Industry
Teemu Heiskanen, Anni Pekkala, Taina Pere and Sebastian Sillanpää
ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV) industry within the US 
automotive industry. The research aims to identify the stage of the HEV industry 
life-cycle and provide insight to the ﬁrm success factors in the industry. Industry 
life-cycle (ILC) theory is used to explain industry development and ﬁrm success 
factors. The main ﬁndings of the research are that the development of entry rates, 
ﬁrm density, sales volumes, prices, and innovativeness behave as the ILC theory pre-
dicts. However, exit rates do not behave as expected. In the light of the ILC theory, 
the HEV industry is in its emergent phase. We also identify that early entrance and 
innovativeness are key factors for ﬁrm survival.
Keywords: hybrid electric vehicle, automotive industry, industry evolution, industry 
life-cycle
81. Introduction
In the recent years, the limitedness of 
fuel-based energy and greenhouse gas 
emissions have become a serious global 
issue that is receiving increased attenti-
on (Bayindir & Gözükücük 2011, Amjad 
et al. 2010). The transportation sector is 
rapidly growing as a consumer of energy 
and consumes about half of the world’s 
oil resources (Ehsani et al. 2004). Ac-
cording to some estimates, if the current 
trends in oil discovery and consumption 
continue, we will run out of oil by 2038 
(Ehsani et al. 2004). Furthermore, tran-
sportation causes a considerable share of 
emissions: In 2007, 39% of total emissi-
ons in the US were caused by transpor-
tation (EPA 2009).
These concerns have driven auto-
motive researchers to develop alterna-
tive methods to generate energy for ve-
hicles (Bayindir & Gözükücük 2011, Am-
jad et al. 2010). Most car manufacturers 
are conducting research on alternative 
powertrains and alternative fuels (Pohl 
& Elmquist 2010).
One of the most promising techno-
logies currently being researched and 
developed is the hybrid electric vehicle 
(HEV). It is deﬁned as a vehicle that de-
rives its propulsion power partly from 
an internal combustion engine (ICE) 
and partly from an electric motor (Cle-
veland & Morris 2009). HEVs differ from 
each other by how the different parts of 
the engine are organized and what share 
of the power is generated by the ICE and 
what by the electric motor (Jaeger 2011).
HEV technology offers a wide 
range of benefits over conventional 
ICE vehicles including improved fuel 
economy, lower emissions (Amjad et 
al. 2010) and multifaceted performan-
ce improvements (Bitsche & Gutman 
2004). Hybridization might represent 
a future paradigm shift and can there-
fore be considered a discontinuity or a 
radical innovation of the future (Pohl & 
Elmquist 2010).
To the best of our knowledge, no pre-
vious scientiﬁc studies have been con-
ducted on the HEV industry evolution. 
Searching two extensive databases (ISI 
Web of Knowledge and Scopus) for topic 
words “hybrid” and “industry” in rele-
vant research ﬁelds did not seem to bring 
up any articles related to the evolution of 
the HEV industry.
With this descriptive study we in-
tend to ﬁll some of the void in industry 
life-cycle (ILC) literature. ILC was cho-
sen as a theory framework, because it 
explains industry development through 
changes in technology development 
and thus suits a technology-intensive 
industry like the HEV industry. We use 
the theories of ILC to analyze the evolu-
tion of the HEV industry to identify what 
life-cycle stage it is currently in and to 
get some insight into the industry suc-
cess factors.
1.1 Industry deﬁnition
According to an expert interview 
with Professor Matti Juhala from the 
Mechanical Engineering Department 
of Aalto University, HEVs do not actu-
ally constitute an industry of their own, 
but instead are a sub-industry of the au-
tomotive industry. HEVs use basically 
the same production lines and proces-
ses as traditional ICE vehicles and they 
are transported, sold and serviced using 
the same networks. The motor techno-
9logy is basically the only thing setting 
HEVs apart from traditional cars. (Ju-
hala 2012)
According to Jaeger (2011) there are 
ﬁve distinct roles among actors in the 
HEV industry: original equipment ma-
nufacturers (OEMs), system providers, 
component providers, technology provi-
ders, and consultancy service providers. 
A single actor can have many roles.
Acknowledging that HEVs are on-
ly a sub-industry of the automotive in-
dustry and that the industry consists of 
several types of actors, in this study, we 
use the term “HEV industry” to refer to 
those OEMs in the automotive industry 
that have a HEV in their product portfo-
lio. Although the HEV industry is a sub-
industry of the automotive industry, we 
will treat it as an independent industry 
in our study.
1.2 Industry history
Although the concept of hybrid electric 
vehicles might seem relatively new to 
the automotive industry, it is actually 
over a hundred years old (Wouk 1997). 
According to Hybrid-vehicle.org (2005), 
the ﬁrst hybrid car was built already in 
1899 by Dr. Ferdinand Porsche.
Despite of its early introduction, the 
idea of HEVs was long ignored. This was 
primarily due to high development costs 
and the uncertainty related to the accep-
tance of electric vehicles. (Illumin 2002)
Toyota was the ﬁrst auto manufactu-
rer to release a widely adapted commer-
cial HEV (Juhala 2012). Toyota Prius 
was released in 1997 in Japan (Pohl & 
Elmquist 2010). In 2000, Toyota began 
to sell a revised version of Prius also out-
side of Japan (Pohl & Elmquist 2010). By 
the end of 2008, Toyota had sold about 
80% of all HEVs globally (Pohl & Elm-
quist 2010).
In the US, Honda was the ﬁrst brand 
in the HEV market. Its Honda Insight 
was introduced in 1999. Toyota entered 
the US HEV market with Prius in 2000 
and exceeded the sales of Honda Insight 
already in the same year. (U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy 2012)
Since the introduction of Prius, all 
major automotive manufacturers have 
become involved in hybrid research and 
development (Bruggers 2000) and many 
of them have introduced their own HEV 
models (Jaeger 2011). Hybrid technology 
is clearly seen as an essential component 
of future vehicles (Illumin 2002).
1.3 Industry description
Through introducing the first HEV 
technologies, Toyota has become a high-
ly central ﬁrm in the HEV value network 
(Jaeger 2011). The industry players are 
highly centralized (Pohl & Elmquist 
2010). Of all the HEV dollar sales bet-
ween 1997 and 2008, Toyota has a share 
of 80%, Honda 14%, and Ford 4% – mea-
ning that these three companies together 
have had a 98% share of the global HEV 
sales during 1997 – 2008. (Pohl & Elm-
quist 2010)
Entrants to the industry have been 
almost exclusively de alio entrants, who 
have operated in the automotive in-
dustry before entering the HEV markets. 
(Juhala 2012)
Although patenting is becoming in-
creasingly popular in the HEV industry, 
competitive advantage is mainly seeked 
from possession of production technol-
ogy, access to markets, and power stem-
ming from economies of scale rath-
er than protection provided by patents 
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(Jaeger 2011). According to Professor 
Juhala, however, some manufacturers 
treat HEVs mainly as a promotional tool 
to signal that the manufacturer has the 
capability to provide cutting edge tech-
nology (Juhala 2012).
There are horizontal technology-
related relationships among industry 
players that span from very collaborati-
ve to very restricted. These relationships 
reﬂect those of the automotive industry 
at large. In many cases manufacturers li-
cense their systems and platforms to ot-
her manufacturers or work jointly with 
other actors to develop new technologies. 
(Jaeger 2011) Toyota, who possesses ma-
ny central HEV patents, has been espe-
cially active in licensing their techno-
logies to other manufacturers (Juhala 
2012) in order to create economies of 
scale (Nonaka & Peltokorpi 2006). Its 
technologies are thus very widely used 
in the industry (Juhala 2012).
Due to the limited sales volumes of 
HEVs compared to traditional cars and 
the lack of HEV standards, the manufac-
turing of motors and other HEV compo-
nents are done mainly in-house. Increa-
sing HEV sales and declining prices are 
expected to lead to increased outsour-
cing of HEV components. (IMAP 2010)
1.4 Research  
 objective and questions
The objectives of this study are (1) to 
identify what life-cycle stage the HEV 
industry is currently in and (2) to get 
insight into the industry success factors.
To identify the life-cycle stage of the 
HEV industry, we ﬁrst study the evoluti-
on of the HEV industry by answering the 
following four research questions:
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We then analyze some of the possible in-
dustry success factors by answering the 
following two research questions:
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1.5 Research scope
In this study, we decided to focus on the 
US, the car market of which is well-de-
ﬁned and large. Time-wise we decided to 
focus on the HEV industry evolution in 
the years 1999–2010 or 1999–2008 de-
pending on data availability. Although 
the HEV industry has not evolved iden-
tically in different regions (Juhala 2012), 
studying the industry in the US probab-
ly also gives some indication about the 
HEV industry evolution globally.
1.6 Structure of the report
The report consists of six sections. In the 
next section, we describe ILC theory, on 
which we base our study, and bring to-
gether some relevant theory to identify 
the stage of the HEV industry life-cycle 
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and discover relevant success factors for 
ﬁrm survival in the industry. In the third 
section, we detail the data and methods 
used to answer the research questions. 
The fourth section presents the results 
of our analyses and answers the research 
questions. The ﬁfth section of the report 
discusses the results and their implica-
tions. Finally, the sixth section concludes 
our study by bringing together what has 
been learned.
2. Theory  
 development
Industry life-cycle (ILC) theory focuses 
on searching for patterns to describe the 
development of industries (Peltoniemi 
2011). The theory explains changes in 
technology development and in industry 
structures as time passes. ILC concent-
rates on business ﬁrms, which are obser-
ved at the macro-level. Changes in ﬁrm 
numbers are explained through changes 
in technology development, which con-
sists of decreasing product variety and 
emerging scale economies. The life-cycle 
of an industry can be divided into the 
phase of emergence and into the phase 
of maturity. Since the HEV industry is a 
young industry, we will mainly concent-
rate on the emergent phase of industry 
development. We make the assumption 
that the industry is in its emergent phase. 
In this theory section, we will go through 
the relevant ILC theories that can help 
to explain the development of the HEV 
industry from the viewpoint of our rese-
arch questions.
According to the ILC theory, an in-
dustry emerges when a new technologi-
cal opportunity is being discovered, and 
multiple ﬁrms are attracted to exploit the 
opportunity by providing new product 
innovations (Klepper 1996). The oppor-
tunity is a discontinuity that is born out 
of new competences, products, produc-
tion processes or by the introduction of a 
considerable increase in the level of per-
formance relative to the price (Ehrnberg 
1995). The latter case can be applied to 
the HEV industry, because increases in 
the fuel price have lowered the price of 
HEVs relative to other automotive alter-
natives, increasing the performance per 
price ratio relative to other automotive 
alternatives.
Innovations can be categorized into 
competence-enhancing or competence-
destroying, the former usually introdu-
ced by incumbents of the industry using 
their existing knowledge and creating 
barriers for entry (Tushman & Ander-
son 1986). In the automotive industry, 
the HEV has been the former kind, sin-
ce all HEVs are produced by incumbents 
that apply their existing knowledge of 
the automotive industry.
The ILC theory assumes that ﬁrms 
have different kinds of expertise and 
backgrounds, which produces diverse 
R&D activities resulting in various kinds 
of innovations (Klepper 1996). During 
this entrepreneurial regime (Audretsch 
1991), information external to the in-
dustry is relevant as new entrants com-
pete in the marketplace (Gort & Klepper 
1982). In the HEV industry, the ﬁrms 
have similar backgrounds and experti-
se, and most of the information comes 
from the external source of the automo-
tive industry in general, and in this res-
pect, the theory is not perfectly suited for 
the HEV industry context.
Innovations can be categorized in-
to incremental, modular, architectural, 
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and radical (Henderson & Clark 1990). 
Clearly the invention of HEV over a hun-
dred years ago was radical in its nature. 
However, in the case of the HEV industry 
in the 1990s, the integrated energy sto-
rage system can be seen as a modular in-
novation, since it added a new complex 
component to the vehicle, but did not 
change the core architecture or the ve-
hicle itself.
According to the ILC theory, in the 
emergent phase of an industry, the entry 
rates should increase, and entry and exit 
rates should be highly positively correla-
ted, resulting in a small net entry (Geros-
ki 1995). The amount of ﬁrms in the in-
dustry forms an inverted U-shaped cur-
ve as a function of market age, and in the 
emergent phase of the industry, a sales 
takeoff is expected as a result of impro-
ved quality and reduced prices (Peltonie-
mi 2011). In our research, we expect the 
entry rates of ﬁrms to grow as a functi-
on of time. We also expect the exit rates 
to correlate positively with the entry ra-
tes. We will also expect the ﬁrm numbers 
to form the beginning of an inverted U-
shaped curve as a function of market age. 
We will also take a look at the sales volu-
mes of HEVs as a function of time, and 
expect the sales volume to increase. We 
will also investigate the price develop-
ment of HEVs. We are interested to see 
whether the price will decrease as the sa-
les volumes increase. This information 
will provide us with a rich picture of the 
early evolution of the industry, and allow 
us to see whether the HEV industry fol-
lows the same kind of development path 
as projected in the ILC theory. In addi-
tion, we will see whether our initial as-
sumption of placing the HEV industry in 
its emergent phase holds true.
The industry moves from the emer-
gent phase to the mature phase when the 
focus of ﬁrms shifts from product inno-
vation to process innovation, which is 
explained by the size advantages in R&D 
(Cohen & Klepper 1996, Klepper 1996). 
Entries to the industry become rare, but 
exits are common (Klepper 1996). In 
contrast to the emergent phase, internal 
industry knowledge is valuable, existing 
ﬁrms need to keep up with the techno-
logical developments, and entrants ha-
ve a disadvantage against incumbents 
(Gort & Klepper 1982). The innovati-
on space in the mature phase is deﬁn-
ed as the routinized regime (Audretsch 
1991). During the transition from emer-
gent phase to the mature phase, a shake-
out during a lengthy period of time oc-
curs, in which the increase in ﬁrm num-
bers is broken, and is continued by a fall 
in the ﬁrm numbers at the same time as 
industry output keeps increasing (Klep-
per & Miller 1995).
ILC theory also studies success fac-
tors of ﬁrms that survive the shakeout, 
and the most common factors studied 
are entry-timing, pre-entry experience, 
and innovativeness (Peltoniemi 2011). 
Since all entrants in the HEV industry 
have similar kind of pre-entry experien-
ce in the automotive industry, we will fo-
cus on entry-timing and innovativeness. 
The ILC studies mostly focus on stu-
dying ﬁrm success factors by examining 
the survival rates of ﬁrms in an industry, 
in which success is determined by ﬁrm 
survival. As the HEV industry is young 
and no shakeout is expected to be witnes-
sed, it is not useful to select ﬁrm survi-
val as a measure for ﬁrm success. In our 
study, we have selected the measure of 
market share as a measure for ﬁrm suc-
cess. Previously, Lee and Lim (2000) ha-
ve used market share as a measure for 
ﬁrm success in their study. In addition, 
Mata et al. (1995) have found ﬁrm size 
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to be an important determinant for the 
likelihood of ﬁrm survival. As ﬁrm size 
and market share are strongly linked, it 
can be to some level argued that mar-
ket share can be used also as a measure 
for ﬁrm survival. In addition, Utterback 
and Suarez (1991) state that ﬁrm survival 
should be related to measures of perfor-
mance such as market share and proﬁta-
bility. We have selected the measure ﬁrm 
market share instead of ﬁrm proﬁtabili-
ty due to the lack of availability of proﬁ-
tability data of the HEV manufacturers 
that would capture only HEV related da-
ta. We use market share as a measure of 
success, and also assume that the higher 
the market share, the higher is the likeli-
hood of ﬁrm survival. In this respect, we 
deﬁne success as having a high market 
share and a high probability for survival.
When it comes to entry timing, the 
ILC research has found evidence both 
in the support of early entrants and late 
entrants, but the majority of the research 
supports the fact that early entrants have 
an advantage against late entrants (Pel-
toniemi 2011). We expect early entrants 
therefore to have higher market shares 
than late entrants.
The ILC theory assumes that inno-
vative ﬁrms have a better likelihood to 
survive (Peltoniemi 2011), technological 
activity increases the likelihood of survi-
val (Agarwal 1996), and that patents inc-
rease ﬁrm survival (Wagner & Cockburn 
2010). We will measure innovativeness 
as the number of released patents by dif-
ferent ﬁrms. In the ILC theory, patents 
have been used as a measure for innova-
tive activity (Gort & Klepper 1982, Agar-
wal 1998). Hall et al. (1986) have showed 
that patents are strongly and positively 
correlated with R&D activity. In additi-
on, Acs and Audretsch (1989) have found 
support for the fact that patents provi-
de a fairly reliable measure of innovati-
ve activity. Here we also deﬁne market 
share as a measure of ﬁrm survival and 
ﬁrm success. We expect that ﬁrms with 
a high number of patents have a higher 
market share than ﬁrms with a lower 
number of patents.
Research has shown that patenting 
rates do not differ in emerging and ma-
ture industries (McGahan & Silverman 
2001). However, there is a shift from pro-
duct innovation to process innovation 
during the industry life-cycle (Abernat-
hy 1978, cited in Peltoniemi 2011; Gort 
and Klepper 1982; Utterback and Aber-
nathy 1975). We expect to see a growing 
number of product-related patents in the 
HEV industry, because we assume that 
it is in the emergent phase.
The ILC theory also addresses the 
theme of dominant design, which emer-
ges as customer preferences have been 
tested (Suárez & Utterback 1995), the 
needs of a broad class of users have been 
satisﬁed (Abernathy 1978, cited in Pelto-
niemi 2011), and sales grow signiﬁcant-
ly as the dominant design emerges (An-
derson & Tushman 1990). Licensing is 
one signal of the emergence of the do-
minant design (Murmann & Frenken 
2006), which is also present in the HEV 
industry. Another important theme in 
the ILC research is inter-industry rela-
tionships. The phenomenon of having 
a mature industry give birth to a new 
technologically related industry has 
been studied in the ILC research (Pelto-
niemi 2011). Using these kinds of studies 
would be interesting and they could pro-
vide more insight to our research, since 
the mature automotive industry has gi-
ven birth to the emergent HEV industry. 
However, we exclude the themes of the 
dominant design and the inter-industry 
relationships from our research. This is 
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because this kind of a research would re-
quire a deep dive into the development of 
the HEV technology and into the deve-
lopment of the automotive industry, for 
which we do not have enough resources 
for. Additionally, we want to ensure a fo-
cused and a high-quality approach to the 
other important themes of ILC theory.
The concepts of the ILC theory and 
our measures of them are presented in 
the Appendix VIII.
3. Data and methods
3.1 Brands, sales  
 volumes and prices
Data
In order to analyse the development of 
the HEV industry, we had to gather his-
torical HEV market data. We used data 
of annual sales volumes in the US from 
1999 to 2010 as the basis for our analy-
sis. The data is provided by the U.S. De-
partment of Energy (2012). As units of 
research, we selected brands of HEV ma-
nufacturers. Naturally, one HEV manu-
facturer can have many brands, which 
can be manufactured in different mo-
dels. The data included the number of 
different brands operating, entering 
and exiting the market. However, given 
that some of the brands are part of the 
same company (for instance, Lexus and 
Toyota), one could argue that the rese-
arch should focus on the parent compa-
nies. Our decision to focus on brands is 
based on Professor Juhala’s recommen-
dation (Juhala 2012). Despite some of 
the brands sharing a parent company, 
they are independent, separate units and 
their market positions differ. Although 
the brands under one parent company 
are likely to engage in cooperation, the 
cooperation is close also across compa-
nies. Therefore, the brands are only a litt-
le less distinctive but signiﬁcantly mo-
re clearly deﬁned basis unit for this stu-
dy than their parent companies. In this 
research, thus, when we refer to HEV 
'(/ ./,,-Ũwe mean ,(-Ũ) ŨŨ
'(/ ./,,-Ũ unless otherwise men-
tioned. 
In order to study the volume and pri-
ce development of HEVs in the 2000s, we 
combined the brand level annual sales 
volumes data with respective price da-
ta. We used manufacturer’s suggested re-
tail price (MSRP) data for a new HEV of 
the respective year’s model. For instan-
ce, the MSRP for Toyota Prius year 2008 
model was used as the Toyota Prius’ pri-
ce in 2008, and 2010 model for the pri-
ce in 2010. The data was obtained from 
Consumer Guide Automotive (2012) and 
Aol Autos (2012) web pages. The price 
data needed to be made comparable bet-
ween years. In general, adjusting the data 
for inﬂation would do this. However, as 
we have discussed, the industry can be 
seen as a sub-industry of the automotive 
industry. Therefore, we decided to adjust 
it for the development of new vehicles’ 
prices in the US. New vehicles index, a 
sub index of the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), was used for this. The data was 
gathered from Federal Reserve Econo-
mic Data (FRED 2012). In order to inter-
pret more reliable results from the volu-
me data, we also examined the develop-
ment of the US automotive market sales 
volumes in general. The data was gathe-
red from National Automobile Dealers 
Associations (NADA 2012) data reports.
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Methods
We used the annual sales volume data 
by HEV model to construct a table pre-
senting which car manufacturers we-
re present in the market in each year. 
From this information, we could deve-
lop graphs presenting the annual density 
of HEV manufacturers and annual entry 
and exit rates. 
In order to address the question 1D 
about the volume and price development 
of HEVs, we examined the development 
of prices and volumes of HEVs between 
three reference years: 2006, 2008 and 
2010. The reason to focus on relatively 
recent years is that in the early 2000s 
there were too few manufacturers on 
the market and thus they would have re-
ceived a disproportionately large weight 
in the sample. However, we acknowled-
ge that Toyota Prius has quite a heavy 
weight even in the late 2000s ﬁgures.
In question 1D, we were interested to 
ﬁnd out whether the HEV industry has 
been developing towards less expensive 
mass market products from niche mar-
kets. We studied this by dividing the mar-
ket into ﬁve price categories and exami-
ning which share of the sales volumes in 
the US market each of these price catego-
ries represented in 2006 and how it had 
developed by 2008 and 2010.
In our analysis, we adjusted the pri-
ces for the development of new vehicles 
index of CPI instead of the whole CPI. 
This was because the HEV industry is 
a sub-industry of the whole automotive 
industry and is thus driven by the same 
trends. By adjusting the prices for the 
new vehicle index, we could study how 
the HEV industry has developed with 
respect to the general HEV industry and 
how HEVs’ position with respect to other 
cars has changed. Similarly, we examin-
ed also the volume data of the US auto-
motive industry and calculated a volu-
me index showing the development of 
HEV volumes with respect to the de-
velopment of the automotive industry 
volumes using the year 2006 as the ba-
se year. The reason for this was mainly 
the ﬁnancial turmoil of late 2000s which 
strained the US automotive industry gre-
atly and which we therefore wanted to 
take into account.
To answer the question whether ear-
ly entrants have an advantage against 
late entrants, we built a graph showing 
market share development for all manu-
facturers on the y-axis, and then the de-
velopment of the number of years these 
manufacturers have been in the industry 
on the x-axis. The number of years a ma-
nufacturer has been in the industry was 
calculated as a simple count of years sin-
ce their ﬁrst HEV model was introduced 
to the market.
3.2 Patents
Data
The patent data was retrieved from Uni-
ted States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO), which is the Federal agen-
cy for granting patents and registering 
trademarks in the U.S. (USPTO 2012a). 
USPTO cooperates with European Pa-
tent Office (EPO) and Japan Patent Of-
ﬁce (JPO) as one of the Trilateral Patent 
Offices. Since most of the automotive in-
dustry in the world operates in these geo-
graphical regions, a patent database con-
sisting of all the patents in these regions 
is sufficient for us.
There is a separate patent class 
for HEVs in U.S. patent classificati-
on, 180/65.21. The number 180 in the 
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code denotes Motor Vehicles and the 
number 65.21 then speciﬁcally denotes 
Hybrid Vehicles. The Hybrid Vehicles 
class 65.21 operates under class 65.1 
which denotes Electric Vehicles (ve-
hicles wherein an electric motor in the 
body or on the body-frame drives the 
vehicle). The patents in this class are 
all so-called product patents meaning 
that they all relate to power transmis-
sion in HEVs instead of their manufac-
turing process. There are altogether 291 
different patents in the patent class of 
Hybrid Vehicles. The ﬁrst patent in this 
patent class has been ﬁled by Wallace H. 
Moore in April 1977 and the last one by 
BNSF in February 2010.
It is always HEV manufacturers who 
ﬁle patents, not any speciﬁc brands. This 
is the reason why, for instance, one does 
not see any patents ﬁled by Lexus: they 
are all ﬁled by Toyota. Therefore, in the 
sections where we investigate patents, 
we treat OEMs as HEV manufacturers 
instead of the brands.
To conduct our analyses with the 
HEV patent data, we needed a table sho-
wing all the patents, the company or in-
dividual that has ﬁled them, and the date 
the patent was ﬁled. Unfortunately, the 
USPTO (2012a) database only allows 
studying one patent at a time and gene-
rating a combined table of the required 
patents with the web browser software 
is not possible. Therefore, we had to ge-
nerate the desired table by hand by going 
through all the 291 patents individually 
and collecting the needed information. 
In the end we had a table showing patent 
assignee, patent number and date ﬁled.
Methods
Based on the Hybrid Vehicle patent 
(HEV patent) tables we had constructed, 
we developed different kinds of graphs to 
answer our research questions. To pro-
ve our initial assumption that the HEV 
industry is still in the emerging phase, 
we were keen to know if the generation 
of product patents has already started to 
decrease. As already mentioned, our da-
taset consisted only of product patents. 
To answer this question, we generated 
a graph showing number of patents ﬁ-
led by each year. Looking at the data, we 
noticed that data was reliable only until 
2008. Because actually obtaining a pa-
tent currently lasts a little bit over two 
years, it is obvious that there are not so 
many patents ﬁled in the last two years in 
the data as they can still be in the patent 
observation process (USPTO 2012b). 
We decided to tackle this problem by not 
using data from years 2009 and 2010. To 
use also company-level patent data, we 
generated another graph where we we-
re able to use the same table we had gat-
hered from USPTO (2012a) database. To 
keep the company-level graph readable, 
we included companies that had more 
than nine HEV patents.
Second, we were interested to know 
whether ﬁrm success is correlated with 
how many patents the ﬁrm has been ab-
le to generate in the HEV patent class. 
Based on the data described above, we 
choose to build a graph comparing mar-
ket shares of different ﬁrms versus the 
amount of patents they have had yearly.
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4. Results
4.1 Industry development
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The density of HEV manufacturers pre-
sent in the US industry can be seen in 
Appendix I. It can be seen that the num-
ber of manufacturers has been following 
quite nicely the exponential trend line 
the whole period 1999–2010. Especial-
ly 2008 was a strong year of entrants in 
the US HEV market with the density in-
creasing by 57%. This was due to entry of 
Chevrolet, GMC, Cadillac and Chrysler 
in the HEV industry. It is worth noting 
that all these manufacturers are from the 
US and all except Chrysler are part of Ge-
neral Motors.
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Appendix II presents annual entry and 
exit rates in the HEV industry. The entry 
rate has been increasing with two notab-
le spikes of which the other was just dis-
cussed. The other spike occurred in 2010 
when the entry rate hit a historical high 
of ﬁve new manufacturers entering the 
US HEV industry. An interesting point 
is that these ﬁve companies include e.g. 
BMW, Mercedes-Benz and Porsche, all 
premium car manufacturers. This would 
indicate that HEVs have started to pe-
netrate into the luxury car segment as 
well. Before 2010 there were only two 
real premium car manufacturers in the 
US HEV market: Cadillac (entry in 2008) 
and Lexus (entry in 2005, Lexus is part 
of Toyota).
The exit rate of the US HEV industry 
is quite interesting: there are no exits 
before 2010 when Chrysler and Dodge 
(owned by Chrysler) exited. The low exit 
rates support the statement by Professor 
Juhala that HEVs are used also as mar-
keting tool: if the HEVs are used for mar-
keting, then it is clear that the company 
is not going to exit the market even if its 
HEVs was not competitive. On the other 
hand, our observation period – and the 
US HEV market in general – is relative-
ly short with respect to the life-cycle of 
a car model. It may be that the manufac-
turers are not expecting the business to 
be proﬁtable until some years in the fu-
ture and the ﬁrst model series are used to 
gain experience and develop the product.
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The evolution of Hybrid Vehicle patents 
ﬁled by each year can be seen in Appen-
dix III. It seems that the number of pa-
tents ﬁled yearly has increased almost 
exponentially year by year from the ﬁrst 
patent ﬁled in 1977 until 2007. Especi-
ally years 2006 and 2007 have been st-
rong as during both those years the num-
ber of patents ﬁled has almost doubled. 
In 2008, the number of patents filed 
turned to decrease. Looking at the data, 
we found out that the main explanato-
ry factor is Nissan whose patenting ra-
te decreased from seven in 2007 to zero 
in 2008. One cannot ﬁnd any particular 
reason for this slump. Actually, Nissan 
presents in its Annual Report in 2009 
various different R&D projects it is cur-
rently executing (Nissan 2009). One has 
to remember that the decrease in patents 
ﬁled in 2008 can also be caused by some 
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patents that are still in the observation 
process. If there are these kinds of pa-
tents still in the observation process and 
if they get accepted, they will be listed as 
patents ﬁled in year 2008.
The evolution of Hybrid Vehicle pa-
tents ﬁled yearly by different manufac-
turers can be seen in Appendix IV. One 
sees here the same kind of exponential 
growth development as with general pa-
tent development graph. One also noti-
ces how the number of patents ﬁled by 
Nissan suddenly slumps in 2008. What 
is important to notice from the graph 
is that the two strongest players, Toyo-
ta and GM, continued to increase the 
number of patents ﬁled with a growing 
pace even in 2008. At the same time all 
the other players, not just Nissan, have 
declined. This indicates that the innova-
tiveness in HEV business might be con-
solidating to the hands of big players.
Based on the two graphs (Appendix 
III and Appendix IV) mentioned above 
it is a bit hard to estimate if the number 
of patents ﬁled yearly really has turned 
into decline since we don’t know about 
patents that are ﬁled in year 2008 but are 
still in the observation process. Howe-
ver, there is not likely to be many of the-
se patents if any since it is already mo-
re than three years from the end of 2008 
and during that time there have been ma-
ny Hybrid Vehicle patents that have been 
granted. Graph in Appendix IV indicates 
that the patent creation among the two 
biggest players is still growing.
Therefore, we conclude that even 
though the exponential growth in Hy-
brid Vehicle patents by all manufactu-
rers seems to have slowed down, the big 
players, namely Toyota and GM, have 
continued to ﬁle product patents with a 
growing pace. Therefore, one cannot say 
that the HEV industry would already ha-
ve moved to mature stage where the main 
innovations are process innovations. To-
yota and GM continue to develop new 
kind of technological solutions for HEVs. 
The Appendix IV indicates also that in 
the future licensing technology from the 
two biggest players might increase as the 
others are not able to keep up with the 
rapid technology development.
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Appendix V presents the development 
of the HEV sales volumes, market sha-
res of the price categories and the volu-
me index. As can be seen, there has been 
a shift towards lower price categories in 
the last years. HEVs with MSRP of less 
than $20,000 (in 2006 car prices) rep-
resented ca. 55% of the market in 2006 
but 64% in 2010. 10% of the HEVs sold in 
the US in 2010 cost less than $20,000 in 
terms of 2006 car prices. This price cate-
gory was non-existent two years earlier. 
On the other hand, the market share of 
the highest price category has remained 
quite ﬂat during the observation period. 
This might imply that although the ge-
neral trend seems to be that HEV prices 
are declining and an HEV is becoming 
more and more widely affordable, there 
is also demand for the HEVs in the pre-
mium cars class. This argument is sup-
ported by the fact that in 2010 majority 
of the new entrants in the business were 
premium brands.
The total HEV sale volume was only 
a little higher in 2010 than it was in 2006 
despite of the strong growth in 2007. The 
signiﬁcant decline in years 2008 and 
2009 was due to the struggle of the au-
tomotive industry in the ﬁnancial crisis. 
As can be seen, the volume index actual-
ly grew in 2008 and 2009, which means 
that the HEV industry kept growing rela-
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tive to the whole automotive industry, i.e. 
the share of HEVs of all cars sold in the 
US increased. In other words, the decline 
in the volumes in years 2008 and 2009 
was caused by the ﬁnancial crisis, but 
HEV industry suffered from it less than 
the general automotive industry. Ho-
wever, an interesting ﬁnding is that the 
decline in HEV volumes continued also 
in 2010 while the automotive industry 
volumes in general went up by ca. 11%.
4.2 Industry success factors
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The market share development of diffe-
rent HEV manufacturers compared to 
the time they have been in the industry 
can be seen in Appendix VI. It seems that 
in general, time in the industry is correla-
ted with market share: all the brands that 
have a decent market share have been in 
the industry for more than ﬁve years. All 
the other big players seem to have a so-
mewhat increasing trend in their market 
share compared to years in the industry 
except for Honda that seems to have a 
decreasing trend in the graph. What is in-
teresting is that even though Honda was 
the ﬁrst one to introduce a HEV in the 
US, it has deﬁnitely lost the main share 
of the market to Toyota. Based on a mar-
ket study conducted in the US, people bu-
ying Toyota Prius felt it less expensive 
compared to other options and in many 
cases as the only option available in the 
market (Hallbright & Dunn 2010). This 
is also something that Professor Juhala 
(2012) pointed out in the interview se-
veral times: even today Toyota Prius is 
the only HEV that is highly available in 
the market.
All in all, we conclude that yes, ear-
ly entrants have had a clear advantage 
compared to late entrants in the HEV 
industry. All the players that currently 
have a decent market share in the HEV 
industry, namely Toyota, Ford and Hon-
da, have also been the ﬁrst ones to intro-
duce a HEV model to the market. 
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The market share development of diffe-
rent manufacturers compared to their 
amount of patents they have had year-
ly can be seen in Appendix VII. It seems 
that in general the market share is cor-
related with the number of patents the 
ﬁrm has quite well. One notices imme-
diately from the graph that the current 
market leader, Toyota, has also the most 
patents. Also two other big players, Ford 
and Honda, have good amount of patents. 
This is something that prof. Matti Juha-
la pointed out in the interview (Juhala 
2012). He thought that the companies 
that have invested a lot in HEV techno-
logy development are more likely to ha-
ve workable HEV models broadly in 
market even today. What is interesting 
about the graph in Appendix VII is that 
while GM has the second most patents, 
it is only fourth in terms of market sha-
re. Thus, one could conclude that even 
though GM has invested a lot in develo-
ping HEV technology, it has not been able 
to capitalize on those innovations.
It is also interesting not to think only 
the current situation based on the graph 
in Appendix VII, but also the develop-
ment of market shares compared to the 
number of patents. It seems that Toyota 
was able to take the controlling stake in 
the industry with eight patents and this 
happened in 2000. Thus, one sees how 
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already in 2000 Toyota mastered the 
innovativeness of HEV industry. From 
the rapid development of the number of 
patents, it looks like it was Toyota who 
was the ﬁrst manufacturer that started to 
believe in hybrid vehicle technology and 
thus started to invest their innovative ef-
forts in it. This was also something that 
prof. Matti Juhala noted in the interview 
(Juhala 2012). Also other two big players, 
Honda and Ford, had already more than 
five patents in 2003. Interesting fact 
about the graph is that even though GM 
has 33 patents at the moment, it has on-
ly managed to generate a market share of 
2.46 % in 2010. The reason might be that 
GM awake to invest in HEV technology 
development quite late.
All in all, we conclude that high num-
ber of Hybrid Vehicle patents seems to 
be correlated with ﬁrm success. Good 
examples of this are the three HEV ma-
nufacturers that actually have a decent 
market share in the HEV industry: To-
yota, Ford and Honda. They all have a 
good amount of patents. What seems in-
teresting is the importance of investing 
in HEV R&D already in the beginning of 
the industry. All these three players we-
re able to produce patents already in the 
1990s. GM ﬁled their ﬁrst Hybrid Vehicle 
patent already in 1992, but then somet-
hing happened and the next patent was 
ﬁled only in 2003.
5. Discussion
We found that the ILC theory can be app-
lied well in the context of HEV industry. 
By using the ILC theory, we were able to 
determine the life-cycle stage of the HEV 
industry and also get some insight into 
the industry success factors.
The development of the number of 
HEV manufacturers, which was stu-
died in the research question 1A, reso-
nates very well with ILC theory, denoting 
that the HEV industry really is still in 
its emergent phase. What is important 
to notice is that the density of HEV ma-
nufacturers seems to follow exponential 
growth pattern very well, just as the ILC 
literature predicts.
The prices of HEVs related to their 
sales volumes have developed exactly as 
the ILC theory assumes. As the sales vo-
lumes of HEVs have increased, also their 
prices have decreased.
One interesting ﬁnding was that the 
number of exits in HEV industry, which 
was studied in the research question 
1B, has not developed as the ILC the-
ory predicts: exit rates have not corre-
lated positively with entry rates as the 
first exits were experienced in 2010. 
There can be various reasons for this. 
One thing that was already mentioned 
is that the entrants to the HEV industry 
are big car manufacturers who are, to at 
least some extent, introducing HEVs as 
a marketing tool and an option for futu-
re. They aren’t in danger of death even 
if the product doesn’t succeed because 
the basic business can cover the losses. 
Actually, the exits that have taken place 
in the HEV industry have been caused by 
restructuring the brand portfolio, rather 
than the bad ﬁnancial returns. Another 
thing worth mentioning is that probably 
the ILC theory about entry and exit rates 
does not apply very well in this kind of a 
sub-industry that HEV industry in the 
end is. Sub-industries often arise from 
some speciﬁc industry meaning that the 
early entrants to this speciﬁc industry 
are not necessarily completely new ﬁrms 
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as the ILC theory assumes.
The development of product HEV 
patents, which was studied in the rese-
arch question 1C, resonates well with 
ILC theory denoting the emergent phase 
of the HEV industry. The strongest cre-
ators of HEV patents are ﬁling new pro-
duct HEV patents with a growing pace. 
However, one has to remember that our 
dataset does not cover patents related to 
process innovations in HEV technology. 
Therefore, the process patents in HEV 
technology can have developed even fas-
ter than the product patents. Thus, we 
can only conclude that according to the 
patent data the HEV product technolo-
gy has not reached its peak point, which 
still according to ILC theory denotes an 
emergent industry.
In research question 2A, we inves-
tigated whether early entrants have an 
advantage against late entrants. Similar-
ly to most of the ILC research, we also 
found that early entrants do have an ad-
vantage against late entrants. However, 
all the studied brands do not show a li-
near correlation as the HEV manufactu-
rer with the longest time in market, Hon-
da, has not performed as well as Toyota.
The effect of patents to ﬁrm success 
was studied in the question 2B. Also he-
re we found that the data resonates very 
well with the ILC theory denoting that 
ﬁrms with higher number of patents ha-
ve a higher market share than the ﬁrms 
with a lower number of patents. Especi-
ally the number of patents very early in 
the development in the industry seems to 
be signiﬁcant in explaining the success 
of a HEV manufacturer.
6. Conclusions
In this research, we were able to identify 
the life-cycle stage of the HEV industry 
and also get some insights into the in-
dustry success factors. HEV industry 
is at the moment in emergent phase 
based on the development of the num-
ber of companies in the industry and the 
number of product patents ﬁled. Ente-
ring early and having many HEV patents 
have proven to be important for the suc-
cess in HEV industry.
7. Limitations and  
 ideas for  
 future research
Although we were able to answer our re-
search question and thereby achieve the 
research objectives, there are some limi-
tations in our methods. First, we were 
not able to be consistent in our decision 
to study the brands of HEV manufactu-
rers rather than their parent companies 
as the patent data was available only on 
the company level. Another limitation 
due to the available patent data was that 
the time period varies between analyses: 
the patent data was reliable only till 2008 
while the time period in other analyses 
continues till 2010.
We propose several topics for future 
research. If the consolidation of HEV in-
novativeness to the hands of the biggest 
patent creators is to continue, it would 
be interesting to ﬁnd out whether other 
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players decrease their innovation acti-
vity and license the technology from the 
bigger players. Is it possible to succeed 
in the HEV industry without having own 
HEV technology? How does the licen-
sing affect the industry structure? Or is 
the consolidation only a sign that the ea-
sily attainable proﬁts have now been ma-
de and therefore less competitive players 
will cease to exist?
Another interesting topic would 
be to dive deeply into the technology of 
HEVs and investigate if a dominant de-
sign has already been introduced. One 
could see Toyota Prius as some sort of 
dominant design because of its dominant 
position in the market, but still Toyota is 
continuing to make new product innova-
tions with a growing pace.
This research has only covered the 
U.S. market. Professor Juhala stated in 
the interview that the U.S. market does 
not fully describe the world market (Ju-
hala 2012). Therefore it would be inter-
esting to ﬁnd whether the results of Ja-
pan or European HEV markets are simi-
lar to the results of this research.
Another interesting topic would be 
to investigate the inter-relationship bet-
ween the mature automotive industry 
and the emergent HEV industry. We 
have touched lightly several important 
themes such as marketing efforts, R&D 
investments, and ﬁnancing base in our 
research, but it would be interesting to 
investigate these factors affecting the 
HEV industry further. It would also be 
interesting to ﬁnd out which ones of the 
traditional carmakers have entered the 
HEV industry. Is it the big, the proﬁtable 
or the technologically advanced?
Furthermore, our results related to 
the patenting activity of the HEV in-
dustry players in the most recent yea-
rs raise questions for future research. It 
seems that patenting activity has turned 
into a decrease. Could it be that all of 
the HEV-related technologies that are 
easiest to develop have already been pa-
tented? Why have only a few ﬁrms ﬁled 
patents recently while the others have 
been inactive in their development ef-
forts?
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The refractive laser eye surgery 
equipment industry evolution 
in the United States
Karla Nieminen, Macarena Pallares, Jenni Silvennoinen and Elina Virtanen
ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the refractive laser eye surgery equipment industry in the 
United States between 1995 and 2012. Motivation to study this industry can be de-
rived from the future potential of the global refractive laser surgery market of 700 
million dollars in revenue with 30 percent estimated yearly growth. The four follo-
wing industry life-cycle (ILC) theory propositions are examined in relation to this 
industry: early entrant advantage, related industry experience advantage, innovati-
ve ﬁrm advantage and the presence of change from product to process innovation. 
Companies researched are those who have obtained Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approval(s) for their machine(s) or are in the process of applying. The amount 
of US patents related to the industry is used as a measure for innovativeness. The 
main ﬁndings are that for this industry the early entrant advantage seems not to hold, 
the related industry experience advantage seems to hold, the innovative ﬁrm advan-
tage seems to hold and the presence of change from product to process innovation 
can neither be conﬁrmed nor denied. Generations of eye surgery technologies are 
also presented. The observation is made that the legitimization of the industry has 
happened but the industry is still not in the mature state of its life cycle.
Keywords: refractive laser eye surgery, laser eye surgery equipment, industry evolu-
tion, industry life-cycle
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1. Introduction
In this study we research the refractive 
laser eye surgery equipment industry in 
the United States. We include in our stu-
dy the equipment that has been approved 
by the FDA (Food and Drug Administra-
tion) and focus on the development of 
the industry in 1995–2012. First appro-
val was issued in 1995, thus we are stu-
dying the whole lifetime of the industry 
in focus.
The excimer laser, a device that uses 
a mixture of argon and ﬂuorine gases, 
was developed in the mid-1970s for the 
need of electronics industry. In 1983 Dr 
Stephen Trokel ﬁled a patent for the use 
of excimer laser in refractive surgery and 
created VISX Company, which was the 
First Laser Vision Correction Company 
(Calloud, O. et. al., 2001). Reﬂective laser 
eye surgery is performed so, that the ou-
ter layer of the cornea is either removed 
(PRK) or moved aside (LASIK) and then 
the deeper layers of cornea are modiﬁed 
with laser to correct vision of the patient. 
Cataract eye surgeries are outside of the 
focus of this research.
The global refractive surgery market 
of over 700 million dollars, mainly dri-
ven by the excimer laser technology, is 
expected to grow 30% in a period of 5 yea-
rs. United States has the largest market 
at the moment, and it is expected to keep 
growing and remain the largest market in 
the upcoming years. Hence, the US mar-
ket was selected as a focus of this stu-
dy. The global refractive surgery market 
revenues in 2011 and the forecast mar-
ket revenues in 2016 are summarized in 
Figure 1. 
The market growth is driven by an 
increasing standard of living especially 
in USA, Europe, Japan and China. People 
have more money to spend and especial-
ly taking care of individual health has be-
come of increasing importance for peop-
le. People are ready to pay for their health 
and some may even have insurance that 
covers refractive surgery. As the quality 
of surgeries improves, more people will 
be interested in operating their eyes. If 
surgery for presbyopia becomes pos-
sible, this opens up further growth po-
tential for the industry. 
The industry is strongly regulated in 
the United States and FDA approves all 
equipment that can be used widely for 
doing surgeries. In addition, surgery cli-
nics are careful in choosing equipment 
for their clinic, as patients are interested 
in having a high quality surgery. In ref-
ractive laser eye surgery equipment in-
dustry, selection is mainly based on the 
quality of operations or especially how 
good results the operations show in cli-
nical examinations. If there are no clear 
results of medical tests, selection may al-
so be based on customers’ perceptions. 
Customers may perceive new and more 
expensive technology to be better. 
2. Literature/Theory  
 development
In this section we will discuss the theore-
tical implications based on which we will 
explore the industry more thoroughly. 
For the purposes of this research, the 
industry subject to our research can be 
deﬁned as the reﬂective eye surgery laser 
equipment producers approved by FDA 
37
in the USA who provide the actual laser 
itself. We also discuss in our study com-
panies that have applied for FDA appro-
val but have yet not received it. We have 
chosen to study the given industry main-
ly in the light of the Industry Life Cycle 
(ILC) theory. However, some elements 
from other industry evolution theories 
such as Ecology and Evolutionary Eco-
nomics will be included. 
The ILC theory presents a view that 
as industries age, they follow a set of sta-
ges from industry emergence to a mo-
re mature stage. Depending on the sta-
ge the industry is at, there are factors 
that affect the industry dynamics and 
the survival of the companies in it. Ac-
cording to ILC, industry emergence ta-
kes place when a technological oppor-
tunity is introduced and followed by a 
set of companies that begin to produce 
products with this technology. The the-
ory also suggests that company numbers 
form an inverted U-curve as a function 
of market age. In the initial phase, where 
the entry and exit rates are high and net 
entry small, discontinuity characterizes 
the industry dynamics. As the emerging 
industry seems ever more lucrative, le-
gitimation takes place and as for examp-
le investors see new investing opportu-
nities in it, increasing rates of entry are 
recorded. As competition of the demand 
and raw materials intensiﬁes, a shakeout 
with very high exit rates takes place. The 
last phase of the inverted U-curve is the 
stagnation phase. In this phase a smaller 
number of companies dominate the in-
dustry (Peltoniemi M., 2011). Next, we 
will take a closer look on what happens 
in the industry life cycle stages relevant 
to our study. 
Young industries are characterized 
by turbulence resulting from the high 
entry and exit rates with net entries only 
accounting for a small fraction of all ent-
ry. Though competition is ﬁerce, compa-
nies embark on population-level lear-
ning from their competitors and joint-
ly develop a standard for ﬁtness in the 
 
Figure 1- Global Refractive Surgery Market Revenues (Market Scope, 2012).
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given industry. This prepares the popu-
lation for taking collective action when 
needed, for example to persuade govern-
ment legislation to more suit the needs 
of the community. As higher acceptance 
of the speciﬁc nature of the technology 
is developed throughout the populati-
on, complementors, government and ﬁ-
nally consumers, the industry standards 
become legitimate; i.e. widely accepted 
(Peltoniemi, M., 2011).
After the industry emergence, com-
petition gradually intensiﬁes. When it 
reaches extremely high levels, a shakeout 
and a transition from product develop-
ment to process research and develop-
ment takes place. Though product deve-
lopment never fully halts, process R&D 
is able to bring the beneﬁts of cost sprea-
ding effect to the companies. In addition 
to the common learning environment in 
the young industries, the economies of 
scale is another reason why the incum-
bent companies and early entrants are 
more likely to survive until the maturity 
stage of the industry. Following the legi-
timation process, industries may deve-
lop a dominant design of their techno-
logy (Peltoniemi M., 2011).
Even though dominant designs are 
too ambiguous concepts to study empi-
rically in detail, a characteristic of such 
a design is that it fulﬁlls the needs of a 
broad class of users and the frequency 
of variations is decreased. A dominant 
design need not be a radical innovation 
that shifts the industry focus fully but 
they can be incremental and only per-
haps introduce a quicker way to reach 
the same results. Dominant designs can 
be for example the shape or minimum ca-
pacity requirements of a given product 
(Peltoniemi M., 2011). 
Emergence of dominant design and 
the proneness to invest in higher unit 
production facilities by the incumbents 
decrease product variation and result 
in less amount of choice for consumers. 
On the other hand it introduces a level 
of acceptance for a reasonable quali-
ty product and protects the consumers, 
manufacturers and other stakeholders 
alike. Dominant designs can emerge in 
a cyclical order, where older designs are 
replaced by newer ones, which quickly 
become the industry standard. Setting a 
dominant design increases the incenti-
ve for companies to grow their capaci-
ties (Murmann JP. & Frenken K., 2006).
As the markets reach a saturation 
stage, a sharp increase in exit rates take 
place. This shakeout can either take pla-
ce after excessive entries into a new and 
fascinating industry or after technologi-
cal developments, where the companies 
unable to conform to produce the domi-
nant design must exit (Bhaskarabhatla 
A., and Klepper S., 2008). In the case of 
a niche, such as that of the refractive la-
ser eye surgery equipment industry, the 
beneﬁts of having relatively lower level 
of competitor density can be offset by 
the more ﬁerce competition over resour-
ces and cause a shakeout (Dobrev S.D., 
Kim T. and Hannan M.T., 2001). Howe-
ver, some research results indicate that 
a shakeout might not take place due to 
technological developments or any other 
particular events but they are a part of 
the competitive process of the industry, 
whereby active innovative moves of the 
early entrants allow them to achieve do-
minant market positions (Klepper S. and 
Simons K., 2005).
The ﬁnal stage of any industry life 
cycle is the mature stage. Here, product 
development takes relatively little pla-
ce but process R&D could, as in the case 
of the Finnish pulp and paper industry, 
continue to produce even multiple times 
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better numbers of output units for ma-
ny decades. Mature industries have high 
barriers of entry for new beginners but 
feed the other emerging industries with 
competence, entrepreneurs, employees 
and new business or technology ideas. 
Mature industries might even create or 
enable new industries to emerge by cre-
ating a need for a new related technolo-
gy for the market (Peltoniemi M., 2011).
As the theory suggests, industries 
emerge in a cyclical order. Mature in-
dustries breed new industries and com-
panies develop products and new com-
panies such as spinoffs that outrun their 
predecessors in an unbeatable way that 
causes them to fade into oblivion. In ca-
se another superior product emerges, the 
capable and ﬁt companies then compe-
te who masters the art of production the 
best. Industry life cycles, therefore, pro-
duce new generations of companies, pro-
ducts, trends, waves of consumption and 
production as time goes by. These gene-
rations either replace one another or at 
times can even coexist before the better 
product or process ﬁnally takes control 
over the industry (Klepper S., and Slee-
per S., 2005).
The industrial ecology theory main-
ly researches the demography of organi-
zations. The most important numbers of 
companies’ life cycles such as the year 
of founding, disbanding, transforma-
tion and growth rate are studied to de-
monstrate the connections between 
them and the change in their environ-
ment, such as industry dynamics. Cont-
rary to ILC theory, companies are seen 
as subject to high inertia forces, what 
makes it very difficult if not impos-
sible for them to change. Inertia follows 
from internal reasons such as not wan-
ting to withdraw from current invest-
ments, company politics, information 
ﬂow constraints and the burden of histo-
ry and tradition. Especially challenging 
factors to change are marketing strate-
gy, core technology, forms of authority 
and stated goals. External inertia forces 
include legal and ﬁscal barriers both to 
entry and exit, contracts that tie a com-
pany to an existing state, difficulties of le-
gitimizing change and constrained ﬂow 
of external information (Baum J.A.C., & 
Shipilov A.V., 2006). 
However, the higher the inertia of 
a company, the more likely it is to sur-
vive in selection processes, since com-
panies with highly reliable past perfor-
mance and accountability have proved to 
ﬂourish. This infers that inertia is also a 
consequence of the selection process of 
the ﬁttest companies to survive, not on-
ly the precondition. In this kind of en-
vironment, legitimation plays a key role 
in deﬁning the industry standards, both 
internally and externally. However, legi-
timation raises the overall industry stan-
dards and therefore enhances the quali-
ty of the business, products and outputs, 
which makes a company in the given in-
dustry a more viable investment target 
(Baum J.A.C., & Shipilov A.V., 2006). 
We have previously discussed the 
main propositions of the ILC theory. In 
this research paper, we will further fo-
cus on discussing, testing and analyzing 
some of the main propositions based on 
the ILC theory as follows:
 Product innovation comes ﬁrst, and 
the focus subsequently shifts to-
wards process innovation.
 Early entrants have higher survival 
rates than later entrants.
 Entrants with experience from rela-
ting industries (i.e. de alio entrants) 
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and spin-off entrants have higher 
survival rates than entrepreneurial 
ﬁrms (i.e. de novo entrants).
 Innovative ﬁrms are more likely to 
survive than non-innovative ﬁrms.
(Peltoniemi M., 2011)
3. Hypothesis and  
 Research  
 Questions 
Based on the ILC literature proposi-
tions, the following null hypothesis are 
presented: 
Hypothesis 1- Companies that ha-
ve gotten the ﬁrst FDA approvals, mea-
ning the early entrants, survive longer 
than others as independent companies.
Hypothesis 2- Companies that ha-
ve earlier experience from relating in-
dustries survive longer than others as 
independent companies.
Hypothesis 3- Companies that have 
more patents, and so are more innova-
tive, survive longer than others as inde-
pendent companies.
Hypothesis 4- The amount of FDA 
approvals per year, and so product in-
novation, decreases as the time passes.
In the next section of this research 
we shall cover the methods of data gathe-
ring and how the selection of relevant va-
riables reﬂecting our research ﬁndings 
has been conducted. 
4. Data and  
 Methodology
This research is exploratory in nature. 
It seeks to assess the state and deve-
lopment of the U.S. refractive eye laser 
surgery equipment industry and to un-
derstand and explain by using industry 
evolution theories the relationships bet-
ween key variables affecting the industry 
during its existence. The research scope 
was chosen to be the U.S. refractive eye 
surgery laser industry to enable compa-
rable and related research data to be gat-
hered for the analysis. Another reason is 
that this market is currently the biggest 
one in the world. We were thus able to 
gather a relatively large research popu-
lation to study. Narrowing down the re-
search scope included selecting the rele-
vant companies by listing all the compa-
nies who have received an approval for 
their laser product from the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), which 
allows them to operate in the given mar-
kets (Saunders M., Lewis P. and Thorn-
hill A., 2007).
Further empirical data search was 
carried out by extracting the patent da-
ta from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office website on all the 
companies that have an FDA approval 
or companies that have applied for an 
FDA approval (FDA 2012). This appro-
ach enabled us to construct a timeline 
for our research as well as to develop 
an understanding of the industry dyna-
mics, which sheds light on the changes in 
the industry structure, changes in num-
ber of companies and their ability to de-
velop further developments or innova-
tions within the industry at a given pe-
riod of time. Collected data was quanti-
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tative numerical data of the application 
and approval year of the FDA approved 
products, the patent ﬁling and approval 
years of the related companies’ patents 
and the companies’ entry and exit year 
to the industry to construct a cohesive 
timeline of its evolution. For future pro-
ducts that are currently in the pipeline to 
be presented to the markets if they will be 
approved by the FDA the data used was 
the FDA application date. 
In order to obtain further understan-
ding of the evolution of the industry, the 
research choice included a combinati-
on of quantitative data and qualitative 
data (Saunders M., Lewis P. and Thorn-
hill A., 2007). Multiple source secondary 
empirical data was acquired from orga-
nizations’ websites and reports, industry 
statistics and reports and company his-
tories. Qualitative data included the ar-
ticles, journals and books concerning the 
theories of Industry Life Cycle (ILC), in-
dustrial ecology and evolutionary econo-
mics. The acquired research data was 
cross-evaluated by group members in or-
der to ﬁnd supportive or contradicting 
arguments of the research results. Any 
differing interpretation was discussed 
in the group to produce a common un-
derstanding to produce a solid analysis.
These companies that have an ap-
proval from FDA for the LASIK or PRK 
to be used for refractive surgery are the 
following: VISX, Inc, Wavelight AG, 
Technolas GMBH Perfect Vision, Sum-
mit Technology, Inc., Nidek, Inc., Laser-
light Technologies, Inc., Carl Zeiss, Inc., 
Bausch & Lomb Surgical, Inc., AMO Ma-
nufacturing USA, LLC and Alcon Labo-
ratories, Inc.
Companies that didn’t have a laser 
device yet approved by the FDA, but ha-
ve ﬁled an application for FDA based on 
the information provided by Market Sco-
pe (2012) were also added to the study. 
These companies are Quantel Medical, 
Customvis, Ellex, IOPtima, Oraya, and 
Avedro.
Patents were searched for all of the 
FDA approved companies and for a new 
rising company called Biolase. The ob-
jective of the search was to list all pa-
tents of these companies with relevance 
for refractive laser eye surgeries. Search 
was done by using a function searching 
SOURCE VARIABLES SELECTED 
The United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) website 
FDA application year 
FDA approval year 
FDA introduction year 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
website 
Patent application year 
Patent approval year 
Organizations' websites and reports  
Industry statistics and reports 
(See M&A reference table) 
Founding years of companies 
M&A years of companies 
Table 1. In order to more clearly summarize our research, we have added a list of 
variables used and the data sources gathered below.
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for words from two groups. To be inclu-
ded in our study the patent abstract had 
to include at least one word from each 
group. Group 1 included the words oph-
thalmic, refractive, cornea, corneal and 
eye. The group 2 included the words la-
ser, excimer, surgery and surgical. 
In order to produce a common un-
derstanding of the terms related to our 
analysis, we shall now give an explana-
tion of all the central terms used throug-
hout the research paper. 
FDA application and the FDA ap-
proval date were collected as well as in-
formation of the year when the compa-
ny ﬁrst introduced the equipment to the 
market. The FDA approval date was us-
ed as the date of the beginning of the li-
fe cycle of a device, and the time before 
the FDA approval as R&D for the device.
Entry to industry of a company shall 
hereinafter be deﬁned as the time of the 
FDA approval of the ﬁrst equipment that 
is presented to the markets. The reason 
for this is that this is the ﬁrst clear date 
after which the equipment manufactu-
rer is allowed to actually operate in the 
industry. An exit for a company is deﬁn-
ed as the state of bankruptcy or being ac-
quired by any other company. 
In terms of analyzing the product 
innovation of companies, innovation 
is measured by the ability to obtain an 
FDA approval for the product. When as-
sessing the overall industry innovation, 
we have chosen as the main metrics the 
ability for any company to produce and 
acquire the right to hold patents related 
to the product in question. Information 
regarding the mergers & acquisitions 
and founding years of the companies was 
gathered using company databases, the 
companies’ annual reports and compa-
ny news. Because many of the companies 
have multiple business units in different 
ﬁelds and because they have eye surgery 
operations internationally, it was chal-
lenging to ﬁnd the relevant years for US 
refractive laser eye surgery market ent-
ry. As stated earlier, we decided to deﬁne 
 
Figure 2- Overall Refractive Eye Surgery development by technology
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entry to market as the ﬁrst FDA approval. 
No exits other than acquisitions or joint 
ventures were found.
Financial data for the companies 
was not gathered since many of the 
companies didn’t have ﬁnancial reports 
publicly available (privately owned) whi-
le other companies were not only wor-
king in the laser eye industry (medical 
conglomerates) and often their ﬁnan-
cial results were not divided by busi-
ness unit. Also global players’ ﬁnancial 
reports were not always divided by re-
gion. This made it difficult to ﬁnd ﬁnan-
cial data that was pertinent to the U.S. 
laser eye industry. Because of the lack of 
ﬁnancial data success was deﬁned as the 
company’s ability to survive as an inde-
pendent company.
5. Results
Also other phases besides excimer laser 
surgeries were found in the history of 
refractive surgeries. The refractive eye 
surgery has developed since the begin-
ning of the 20th century when the Radial 
Keratotomy (RK) refractive procedure 
was developed to correct myopia (Bas-
hour M. & Benchimol M., 2005). This 
procedure was developed and used un-
til the beginning of 1990s, when a new 
manual procedure called Automated La-
mellar Keroplasty substituted RK. 
Between 1980 and 1995 around 70 
patents were approved regarding the use 
of laser for eye surgery that allowed the 
development of new procedures. In 1995 
Summit Technologies, Inc. was the ﬁrst 
company to gain FDA approval for PRK 
and to market its laser in the U.S. to tre-
at people with ‘low myopia’. This was the 
beginning of the Laser Vision Correction 
(LVC) market (Calloud, O. et. al., 2001).
As the technology improved, a new 
procedure called LASIK, which could 
treat most refractive errors, was develo-
ped and the superiority of the procedure 
over PRK became evident. In 1997 the 
majority of the surgeons began to switch 
from PRK to LASIK (Calloud, O. et. al., 
2001) and LASIK, became the dominant 
design in the market. 
Although a new technology called 
Phakic intraocular lens has been develo-
ped (non invasive procedure) it is not in 
use. In 2009 the FDA announced that an 
integrity hold has been removed from the 
STAAR company’s application of the Vi-
sian ICL device, which was approved by 
the FDA in 2005 (MarketWatch, 2012). 
Thus they removed the FDA approval for 
this technology. No further FDA applica-
tions for the use of this technology have 
been ﬁled.
To date, LASIK remains the de-facto 
standard in the market and since 2000 
there are only FDA applications regar-
ding this procedure instead of PRK or 
other procedures. Figure 2 summarizes 
the development of the different techno-
logies for refractive eye surgery. The ge-
nerations of different technologies ha-
ve been divided to laser procedures (the 
green box) and to traditional surgeries 
(the blue box).
Figure 3 shows when introductions, 
acquisitions and joint ventures of com-
panies of the industry have happened. 
The companies presented in ﬁgures 3 
and 4 are considered the major players 
in the US market because they have FDA 
approvals for their products or, in the ca-
se of the future companies in pastel co-
lors, are emerging companies applying 
for FDA approvals. As we deﬁned suc-
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cess as surviving we have in the end 6 
successful FDA approved companies 
and 6 more companies that are applying 
for the approval. It can be seen that all 
companies that have exited the market, 
have been acquired by other companies. 
There is no information that any compa-
nies would have exited the market becau-
se of ﬁnancial reasons. Through acquisi-
tions companies may gain capabilities, 
e.g. patents, ways of operating or doing 
research and development. In evolutio-
nary economics theory, gaining capabi-
lities is considered extremely important. 
Hypothesis 1, companies that ha-
ve gotten the ﬁrst FDA approvals, mea-
ning the early entrants, survive longer 
than others as independent companies, 
can be answered based on the informa-
tion on ﬁgure 3. The early entrants are 
Summit Technology, Advanced Medical 
Optics and VISX. We can see, that all of 
these have been acquired. Based on this 
data and our decision to deﬁne acquisi-
tions as exit and not sought after survival 
the answer to the hypothesis is no.
Hypothesis 2, companies that ha-
ve earlier experience from relating in-
dustries survive longer than others as 
independent companies, is yes based on 
this situation. The entrants with previo-
us experience (i.e. de alio entrants), Al-
con, Abbott, Bausch & Lomb, Carl Zeiss 
and Nidek, are almost all surviving and 
they have bought many other companies. 
Alcon is the exception, being acquired 
by Novartis in 2008. Another exception 
is Lasersight Technologies which has 
existed in the market only since 1994, 
but is still operating. These facts sup-
 
Figure 3- Establishments, acquisitions and joint ventures of the companies. 
Orange star is the ﬁrst FDA approval application of a company and blue star is 
the ﬁrst FDA approval of a company. (M&A ref. table)
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port the ILC principle of de alio or spin 
off advantage.
Figure 4 shows how number of 
FDA approvals per company has chan-
ged from the ﬁrst equipment generation 
(PRK) to the second (LASIK). Compa-
nies involved in acquisitions with each 
other have been colored similarly and 
have black boxes around their shares. 
FDA has approved 15 applications for 
PRK and other refractive surgeries and 
29 applications for LASIK surgery. Es-
pecially the number of approvals for Al-
con Laboratories, Summit Technology 
and Wavelight, which are all currently 
owned by Novartis, has increased from 
the older technologies to LASIK. Figu-
re 5 shows the FDA approvals separated 
by company and by generation from ot-
her technologies to LASIK. Carl Zeiss is 
a new entrant to the US market for the 
LASIK technology. Carl Zeiss has been 
operating in other countries before en-
tering the US market and it has no ap-
provals for the US market for the older 
technologies.
In addition, there are six potential 
new entrants to the industry that have 
applied for an FDA approval but have 
not yet received one. There are only two 
companies, Carl Zeiss and Wavelight AG, 
that have gained approval for LASIK la-
ser without having an approval for the 
previous PRK or other refractive surge-
ries (see ﬁgure 4). Potentially, Carl Zeiss 
was earlier not interested in the US mar-
ket but has been active in other areas, and 
thus has risen in both FDA approvals and 
patent numbers only in recent years. 
Figure 6 shows the number of com-
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Figure 4. FDA approvals per company for PRK and other refractive surgeries and 
LASIK surgery
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panies in the industry between 1970 and 
2010. This ﬁgure includes the companies 
that have gained an FDA approval or ha-
ve ﬁled for an approval. It seems that 
after 2005 there is some decline in the 
number of companies entering, but the 
industry cannot be stated to be in matu-
rity stage yet. However, there have been 
several acquisitions in the industry du-
ring the recent years and six new compa-
nies have not yet gained an FDA approval 
and hence they still are not able to opera-
te fully in the market. If the new compa-
nies will not get the FDA approvals or the 
existing big companies acquire them, the 
industry already shows signs of maturity. 
It remains to be seen, how the industry 
develops in the future and how soon it 
will reach stage of maturity. 
Hypothesis 3, companies that have 
more patents, and so are more innova-
tive, survive longer than others as inde-
pendent companies, is examined next. In 
ﬁgure 9 we see the total number of pa-
tents in a year and the yearly patents by 
companies according to ﬁgure 3 M&A 
developments. Nidek shows a slight 
decline, which maybe be due to focusing 
on other markets than US. The Chinese 
owned company Lasersight seems to ha-
ve an exceptional strategy compared to 
others because of its few patents. May-
be it has licensed technology from ot-
hers or has not protected its technolo-
gy with patents. It could also be the case 
that Lasersight hasn’t really built its bu-
siness according to management expec-
tations and is exiting the industry. Biola-
se has been included because of its quick 
rise in patent numbers. It is a company 
to have an eye on in a future research of 
this industry.
The number of patents approved has 
increased heavily in the past ten years, as 
it can be seen in ﬁgure 9. For each period 
of 5 years, starting from year 2000, mo-
re than 140 patents related to laser eye 
surgery have been approved. The trend 
doesn’t seem to be diminishing, since in 
the last two years already 50 patents have 
been approved. The ﬁgure also highlights 
that there have been 3 main companies 
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Figure 5 – Approval year of FDA applications per company (LASIK as orange line 
and other technologies as a blue line). This shows the development cycles of the 
products (not the use or company cycles).
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Figure 6 - Total amount of companies having or applying FDA approval for their 
laser eye surgery machines
that have pushed the development of the 
laser eye surgery equipment industry 
during the previous decade; these were 
Visx, Novartis (created by several acqui-
sitions) and LaserSight. The collective 
number of patents by these companies 
account for more than 80% of the patents 
approved from year 2000. 
In ﬁgure 10 there are approved pa-
tent amounts for all the companies be-
fore 2001. Based on this the innovative-
ness of different companies is evaluated. 
Alcon, Nidek and VISX are early ent-
rants with high innovativeness. Bausch 
& Lomb joins the best patent generating 
companies a bit later, but can still be con-
sidered as innovative compared to other 
companies with lowest patent amounts. 
When we compare these four most 
innovative companies of the early pha-
ses of the industry to the later phases we 
see that they are still doing well. They are 
still at the top of patent generating com-
panies (VISX as part of AMO and Alcon 
as part of Novartis), with the exception 
of also Carl Zeiss joining them. Based 
on survival (not acquired) the ones still 
standing are Nidek and Bausch & Lomb. 
Next success is examined in also other 
terms than survival. According to our 
FDA approval amounts (ﬁgure 4), the 
most successful are Bausch & Lomb and 
the companies that include VISX and Al-
con (AMO and Novartis). The only early 
innovative ﬁrm that is not in top in FDA 
approvals is Nidek. Nidek, Alcon and 
Technolas (part of Bausch & Lomb) are 
the only existing FDA companies app-
lying for new machine approvals (table 
2). The result thus seems to be positive.
Hypothesis 4, the amount of FDA 
approvals per year, and so product in-
novation, decreases as the time passes. 
To answer this question we have focus-
ed on the amount of FDA approvals per 
technology, legitimization process and 
future approvals to come in the pipeline.
Based on ﬁgure 11, the number of 
application for PRK or other refractive 
surgery laser equipment has decreased 
before 1999. Thereafter, no applications 
have been ﬁled to get an FDA approval 
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for laser equipment to be used for PRK 
or other refractive surgery. In ﬁgure 12, 
it can be seen that after an initial high 
activity in application ﬁling, the number 
of applications per year has decreased 
before another increase in 2005. After 
2007, most of the companies that have 
already FDA approvals have not ﬁled for 
new approvals. However, especially new 
entrants to the market have applied for 
approvals in 2009–2012. 
As a whole it seems that the industry 
is ﬁling less applications for approval of 
new equipment and therefore it can be 
 
 
Figure 9 - Total number of Approved Patents and number of approved patents per 
company per 5 years. Patents and companies are combined according to current 
ownership, see ﬁgure 3.
Figure 10 - Number of approved patents per company per 5 years. Patents and 
companies are not combined according to current ownership. The early years of 
the industry are examined.
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assumed that the companies are focu-
sing more on developing the manufac-
turing of existing products, i.e. on pro-
cess innovation. 
In industrial ecology theory, legiti-
macy is an important concept describing 
the formation and stabilization of the in-
dustry. One part of gaining legitimacy is 
that the regulators understand better the 
products and create clearer rules and re-
gulations for guiding the market. In ref-
ractive laser eye surgery equipment in-
dustry, an important aspect of regulati-
on is getting acceptance from the FDA 
that approves the usage of each laser and 
also restricts the purpose of use of the 
laser. Based on ﬁgure 7, the duration of 
application handling has reduced clear-
ly since 1990. For the ﬁrst applications, 
the duration of handling was several yea-
rs. After 1997, the duration of applicati-
on handling was less than two years and 
after 2003 most of the applications were 
handled in less than one year. We thus 
conclude that one important part of le-
gitimation process has become faster. 
However, looking at the equipment for 
which an FDA approval has been ﬁled 
but no approval has yet been gained, the 
duration of application handling seems 
to have increased. However, the applica-
tions ﬁled in 2009 were both for new kind 
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Figure 11, Number of applications sent for FDA approval, PRK and 
other refractive surgeries.
Figure 12, Number of applications sent for FDA approval, LASIK surgery.
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of laser equipment and thus cannot be 
compared to the others. For the equip-
ment for which an approval has been 
applied in 2010 or later, there is no in-
formation available that these would be 
signiﬁcantly different from current laser 
equipment used. 
Duration of application handling has 
reduced as FDA has gained more experi-
ence. Still as a new technology for surge-
ry is introduced, FDA is likely to be cau-
tious in approving new technologies for 
wider use. In the beginning, the compa-
nies have also less experience of making 
applications and this is also likely to in-
crease the duration of handling applica-
tions in the beginning of a new techno-
logy generation.
Figure 8 presents the year of intro-
duction to market, year of ﬁling for FDA 
approval and year of getting FDA appro-
val for each individual laser type. As a 
single laser type may be approved for a 
speciﬁc usage, e.g. only for myopia surge-
ries or a speciﬁc range of myopia, the list 
may include several times the same laser 
type that has been approved for usage for 
different purposes.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the 
ﬁrst FDA approvals for PRK and other 
refractive surgeries were received in 
1995 and the last one in 2000. This can 
be seen as the most active time of deve-
lopment for this generation of laser sur-
gery technology. The ﬁrst FDA approval 
for LASIK laser was received in 1998 
and until 2000, several companies had 
already received an approval for exci-
mer laser to be used for LASIK surgery. 
Thereafter, the development of new la-
ser equipment only focused on LASIK 
even though PRK is better to be used in 
some surgeries. During 1998–2007 the 
most active time of development of la-
sers for LASIK generation took place. 
After 2007, only one FDA approval has 
been given and during 2007–2008 only 
one application has been ﬁled for FDA. 
In 2009–2011 there seems to be a new 
period of development as several appli-
cations have been sent for FDA.
This can be interpreted so that the 
focus of innovation shifts in the industry. 
When a new generation of technology 
enters the market, there is a period of 
product innovation leading to the deve-
lopment of a new technology and various 
new approvals of the usage of the techno-
logy for eye surgeries. After product in-
novation, the development focuses on 
process innovation. During this stage 
companies focus more on making the 
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Figure 7 – Duration of FDA application handling per year of application
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production process of laser equipment 
more efficient and of higher quality and 
do not create new products that would 
require FDA approvals. 
The ﬁgure also shows the latest FDA 
applications for LASIK, ﬁled between 
2009 and 2011, that have not yet been 
approved. As highlighted before, there 
has been a period of a couple of years, 
were not many devices have been ap-
proved, nevertheless the ﬁling for new 
FDA approvals has continued. The ﬁgure 
also highlights (circled) two new devices 
that do not use excimer laser technology 
for the LASIK surgery, and have develo-
ped the use of the CO2 laser and Solid 
State Laser for LASIK use. Both compa-
nies applied for FDA approval in August 
2009, making the span between the app-
lication and approval longer than usual. 
This, as stated before might be due to the 
FDA being cautious in approving new 
technologies for wider use.
The new device development is 
mainly lead by new companies in the 
market, since only 3 companies, out of 
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Application
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Figure 8 – Introduction to market, FDA approval application year and 
approval year
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6 companies that already have FDA ap-
proved devices, have a new device to be 
released in the pipeline for the upcoming 
years. The devices applying for FDA ap-
proval are listed in table 2. This shows 
that there are still companies that want 
to become new entrants in the USA la-
ser eye refractive surgery market, and 
that the shake out period has probably 
not yet began.
6. Discussion 
 and Limitations
The U.S. laser eye surgery equipment in-
dustry is forecast to keep growing in the 
upcoming years at a rate of 6% a year, 
therefore having a good growth prospect. 
The number of companies in the market 
is rather stable, where some early ent-
rants have been acquired, and some new 
entrants have recently tried to join the 
market.
Although, as stated previously, the-
re is a good growth forecast for the in-
dustry, the amount of new players is li-
mited. This can mainly be explained by 
the market regulations being very tight, 
the amount of money need to be spent in 
R&D to come up with new patents and a 
laser equipment that could be approved 
by FDA as well as the time that it takes 
to get FDA approvals, making it a difficult 
market to get in. 
Furthermore, the industry has been 
able to gain legitimacy from the begin-
ning of the new century, and now the re-
gulators understand better the products 
and are able to create clearer rules and 
regulations for guiding the market. The 
legitimacy can also be seen, in the adapti-
on of this type of surgery between peop-
le and the expected industry growth in 
the future.
Number of FDA approvals for LA-
SIK is twice as much as for PRK and 
other refractive surgeries. The applica-
tions for FDA approval for PRK were 
ﬁled in 8 year time period (1991–1999) 
and the applications for LASIK approved 
so far were ﬁled in a 10 year time period 
(1997–2007). These observations sug-
gest that LASIK has become the domi-
nant design in the industry. Yet there are 
no challengers for the LASIK technolo-
gy. Improvements can be done though, as 
Future Device Manufacturer FDA Application Date 
IOPtiMate  IOPtima  August 2009 
PULZARTM Z1 Customvis  August 2009 
ALLEGRETTO EX-400  Alcon  January 2010 
IRay System  Oraya  January 2010 
Ellex 2RT  Ellex  April 2010 
Navex Quest  Nidek Co, Ltd.  April 2010 
Supracor  Technolas  January 2011 
SUPRA 577 Quantel Medical  August 2011 
KXL System  Avedro  March 2012 
Table 2. The summary of the device name, manufacturer 
and FDA application date for new devices.
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LASIK is not suitable for all eye shapes 
and can cause problems like blurriness 
in night vision.
It is too early to say at what exact 
stage is the industry in but our research 
suggests that there is still more poten-
tial of growth and the shakeout period 
will only come in years to come. A lot 
of patents have still been approved for 
this technology in the recent years and 
the expectation is that more will come 
to the pipeline. Also, although there has 
been a shift from product innovation to 
process innovation, it can not be seen 
that the industry has reached the ma-
turity state. New technologies to repla-
ce the current dominant design, LASIK, 
may still be introduced.
Limitations of our study are ackno-
wledged and stated here. We have focus-
ed only on the U.S. markets. They may be 
the biggest currently, but as populations 
in developed countries decrease and the 
economies of developing countries imp-
rove, the biggest markets may be found 
elsewhere. Also Europe is a major mar-
ket for laser eye surgery, but was exclu-
ded in our study because of lack of infor-
mation. FDA authority made the U.S. the 
best research area.
Focusing only on FDA approved or 
FDA approval applying companies is al-
so a major limitation. Companies doing 
business in other countries do not need 
this approval. Companies can also licen-
se a technology and so do not need to app-
ly any approvals. Finding the companies 
entering the business was challenging, 
because the companies do not need ap-
provals for R&D. Also the amount of FDA 
approvals is questionable as a criteria for 
success, because companies can impro-
ve their machines a little or start to use 
same machine for multiple laser eye sur-
gery purposes and so apply approval for 
the same machine multiple times.
We have not included cataract eye 
surgery technologies in our research. Ca-
taract is a common problem with aging 
economies and signiﬁcant part of laser 
eye surgeries. If laser treatment for al-
so age vision (hyperopia) is developed, 
that can alter the industry structure and 
focus.
Patent data was searched with an 
automatic function, which can cause 
errors. We may have not detected the 
right key words to use in the search or we 
may have included too many key words 
and found patents not related to this in-
dustry. Also we do not have the neces-
sary technological knowledge to com-
pare the signiﬁcance of the contents of 
the patents.
Further topics for research rela-
ted to this industry could be for examp-
le other geographical areas, acquisition 
reasons for this industry, comparison of 
development of new technologies (LA-
SIK and possible alternatives), quality of 
the patents of the FDA approved com-
panies, ﬁnancial success of the compa-
nies and differences in the different ge-
nerations of technologies (LASIK, PRK 
and others).
7. Conclusions
Four hypotheses examining the ILC the-
ory suitability for the refractive laser eye 
surgery equipment industry evolution in 
the United States were examined. Both 
qualitative and quantitative data we-
re conducted to test these hypotheses. 
Based on the results of the results of the 
M&A analysis, and the decision to deﬁne 
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from these ﬁndings is that the companies 
that have more patents, can be conside-
red more innovative, and therefore have 
better chances of adaptation and survi-
val in the industry. This is aligned with 
the ILC main proposition.
Hypothesis 4 got mixed results. On 
the one hand the industry’s most impor-
tant players have been ﬁling less appli-
cations for approval of new equipment. 
Therefore it can be assumed that the 
companies are focusing more on deve-
loping the manufacturing of existing 
products, and therefore focusing in pro-
cess innovation. This would prove the 
hypothesis to be correct. On the other 
hand there have been FDA applications 
in the past few years, mainly led by new 
companies, for new devices and new 
technologies (such as CO2 laser and so-
lid state laser). This would imply that so-
me companies are still focusing on pro-
duct development, and would mean that 
our hypothesis is incorrect. The overall 
ﬁnding seems to be that mature compa-
nies tend to focus more at this stage on 
process development, whereas compa-
nies that want to be new entrants to the 
market tend to focus on product deve-
lopment.
Overall, the research shows that the 
refractive eye laser surgery equipment 
in the United States has not yet reach-
ed the mature state, since there are still 
companies that want to enter the market 
by gaining FDA approval for their new 
technologies. It also showed that a legi-
timization process has occurred, and the 
regulators have understood better the 
products and have created clearer rules 
and regulations for guiding the market; 
thus speeding the FDA approval process 
for technologies already in place.
acquisitions as exit, Hypothesis 1 is re-
jected. Companies that are early entrants 
didn’t have higher survival rates than la-
ter entrants, which is opposing one of the 
ILC main propositions. The conclusion 
drawn from this ﬁnding is that early ent-
rants could not do the shift to the new 
LASIK technology, and although they 
were competitive and had high survival 
rates during the previous technologies 
they were not able to cope with the new 
changes, therefore being acquired. It is 
probable that if the industry was analy-
zed at a different phase of time, the re-
sults would have been coherent with 
the ILC theory therefore presenting the 
challenge on what time frame and how 
to deﬁne an industry.
Hypothesis 2 is accepted, based on 
the results that companies with ear-
lier experience from relating industries 
seem to have high survival rates since 
they are almost all market players at the 
moment and the quantitative result that 
six potential new entrants haven’t been 
able to obtain the FDA approval, thus 
being in disadvantage with the de alio 
entrants. This supports the ILC theory 
proposition of related industry advanta-
ge. It also shows that there are new ent-
rants to the industry, and therefore it has 
not reached the maturity stage. Based on 
the results analyzed we think that the in-
dustry might reach maturity in the upco-
ming years, and when the shake off peri-
od occurs, the companies with experien-
ce will have much higher survival rates.
Hypothesis 3, companies that have 
more patents survive longer than others 
as independent companies, is accepted. 
The number of patents that a company 
has seem to correlate to the survival rates 
of the companies. The conclusion drawn 
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Figure A1. Introduction to market, FDA approval application year and approval 
year per company (LASIK and older technologies)
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Founding dates and acquisition 
information: Articles 
Health professionals’ editorially neutral information resource 
ModernMedicine, 
http://www.modernmedicine.com/modernmedicine/Ophthalmology/hom
e/40207 
Specialty clinical news information website Healio, 
http://www.healio.com/ophthalmology/ 
Founding dates and acquisition 
information: Company Websites 
NIDEK Ophthalmic Equipment and Instruments, http://usa.nidek.com/
Abbott Healthcare company, www.abbott.com/ 
Technolas Perfect Vision femtosecond and excimer laser eye surgery 
technologies, http://www.technolaspv.com/dasat/images/5/100955-11-
12-06-victus-ce-mark-press-release.pdf 
New companies information (pastel 
colors), FDA application dates The U.S. Food and Drug Administration website, http://www.fda.gov/ 
M&A reference table for ﬁgure 3:
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Legitimacy of the Finnish 
payday loan industry1
Tomi Hiirsalmi, Ilkka Lampio, Liisa Sallinen and Arttu Vesterinen
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a study discussing legitimacy of an industry, using the rather 
recently established payday loan industry in Finland as an empirical case. As the 
industry has a poor reputation, but is still growing and the proﬁts are high, there is 
a motivation to gain deeper understanding on the factors which constitute the legi-
timacy of an industry. Drawing from literature concerning legitimacy, we use a fra-
mework of and use it to analyze the legitimacy of the industry. Based on the results, 
legitimacy of an industry consists of 1) density-based; 2) regulative legitimacy; and 
3) social legitimacy. Our ﬁndings suggest, that the most important legitimacy factor 
for the payday loan industry is regulative legitimacy, which can be comprehended as 
a perquisite for the other two legitimacies. With regulative legitimacy, an industry 
can grow and ﬂourish, even if social legitimacy is not that high. 
Keywords: Legitimacy, industry, payday loan industry
1 This study was conducted for the course Industry Evolution lectured by D.Sc. Joonas Järvinen and D.Sc. Mirva 
Peltoniemi, in spring 2012 at Aalto University School of Science. We acknowledge D.Sc. Joonas Järvinen for advice 
on how to improve this research paper; as well as the opponent students, who also gave us valuable comments and 
suggestions concerning the paper. 
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1. Introduction
Legitimacy is an essential asset for the 
survival of organizations (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; Singh et al., 1986; Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994; Alrdich & Ruef, 2006). Eco-
logical approaches to organization popu-
lations have assessed legitimacy in orga-
nizations at ﬁrst from density dependen-
ce view (Hannan & Freeman, 1972; Han-
nan & Carroll, 1992; 2000), but later on 
completed this perspective with sociolo-
gical perspectives (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: 
186), by discussing legitimacy as social 
acceptance of an (Suchman, 1995), or as 
conformance to institutionalized prac-
tices (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Our 
interest in this study is to examine – by 
exploiting – these approaches – the legi-
timacy of an industry, by analyzing a rat-
her new industry that is the payday loan 
industry in Finland.
A payday loan is a short-term, small 
and unsecured loan usually between 
€50 and €400 that you can get in minu-
tes via SMS or the internet. The yearly 
interest rate is between 250 % and 1500 
% and payback time is usually 14 or 30 
days. The high interest rates are partly 
explained by the high default rates of the 
loans. There was a market gap for this 
industry as banks do not grant so small 
loans in such a short notice. The media 
has claimed that most payday loans are 
taken because of acute need of money for 
partying, alcohol, tobacco, food or pay-
ing for other bills. Payday loans solve 
the acute problem, but they might pose 
other problems for the customer due to 
payback difficulties. (Studia monetaria 
– yleisöluento, 2008)
The Finnish payday loan industry 
is young and rapidly growing. The ﬁrst 
firms entered the industry in March 
2005 (Markkola, 2010). In Q3 2011, there 
were already 81 ﬁrms in the industry in 
Finland, and about 50 ﬁrms had alrea-
dy exited mostly because of high rates of 
competition and some regulation. (Kuu-
sisto, 2011) The payday loan industry 
globally is older and a lot bigger than 
in Finland. For example, it is estimated 
that in the US, the payday loan volume 
has grown from about $8 billion in 1999 
to between $40 and $50 billion in 2004 
(Murray, 2005). This can be compared 
to €244 million, the amount of payday 
loans granted in Finland in 2010.
The payday loan industry invokes 
lots of discussion and it is visible in our 
everyday lives because of aggressive ad-
vertising, and frequent writing about it 
in the media. There has been news about 
payday loan firms making extraordi-
nary proﬁts. The attractiveness of prof-
its combined with very low barriers to 
entry has tempted several ﬁrms to en-
ter the industry. On the other hand, the 
industry has received lots of negative 
media attention and it has a rather poor 
reputation. This can be seen for example 
from the several, usually negative, inter-
net forum discussions about the payday 
loans. There has been discussion about 
regulating the industry. Some members 
of parliament have even tried to ban the 
industry. (Kauppalehti, 2011) 
In conclusion, it seems that regard-
less of the bad reputation of the industry, 
it is rather successful and continuing to 
grow at a fast pace. This motivated us ask 
where do these differences emerge from. 
To our knowledge, no scientiﬁc research 
of these subjects in the payday loan in-
dustry has been previously made. The-
refore we pose the following research 
question:
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legitimacy of the Finnish payday lo-
an industry? 
The research focus of this study is the le-
gitimacy of a rather new industry form. 
The study draws mainly from legitimacy 
research in organizational ecology and 
organizational legitimacy. This study is 
descriptive and exploratory, since we 
aim at describe and explain the pheno-
mena relating to the legitimacy. This re-
search is positioned in the ﬁeld of orga-
nizational ecology, and the legitimacy 
approach.
This report is structured as follows. 
In the second chapter we will review li-
terature and develop a framework for da-
ta analysis. In the third chapter we will 
present the research method, data col-
lection and analysis. In the fourth chap-
ter, we will present the results. In the last 
two chapters, we will reﬂect the results 
with the reviewed literature. We will al-
so discuss our contributions to related 
research and end this report with con-
clusions. Data tables and charts are in-
cluded in the appendices at the end of 
the report.
2. Literature review
2.1 Legitimacy of an  
 industry in ecological  
 approach
In ecological research, legitimacy was 
originally described as a factor of exter-
nal pressure towards inertia (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1972). Legitimacy is traditio-
nally perceived to arise from density in 
organizational populations: The num-
ber of ﬁrms is said to correlate with the 
level of legitimacy (Hannan & Carroll, 
1992; 2000). However, the downside is 
that when legitimacy of an industry in-
creases, it becomes more tempting to 
new entrants and the size of population 
grows, resulting to tougher competition 
(Hannan & Carroll, 1992). 
Dobrev et al. (2006) argue that when 
a new organizational population is emer-
ging, the growth in the number of ﬁrms 
is usually slow and unsteady, which ac-
crues from the lack of constitutive legi-
timacy. In order to gain legitimacy, the 
industry needs big enough number of 
new organizations. Lange et al. (2009) 
have noted that in fact de alio entrants 
can enable the survival of de novo ﬁrms, 
because they build the legitimacy of the 
industry (Lange et al. 2009). In general, 
the incumbent organizations are consi-
dered as more legitimate than new ent-
rants (Baum & Shipilov, 2006). This 
phenomenon was called &##&#.3Ũ) Ũ(1-
ness, by Singh et al. (1986). However, the 
increasing number of ﬁrms applying the 
same form will build trust and conﬁden-
ce in potential customers and partners 
(Dobrev et al., 2001). Baum and Shipilov 
(2006) argue that large ﬁrms have higher 
legitimacy than small ones. 
Nevertheless, legitimacy of an in-
dustry can be understood as a collecti-
ve good, which all organizations in the 
industry can exploit (Rao, 1994). Later 
entrants to an industry can make use of 
spill-overs from incumbent organiza-
tions’ legitimacy (Alrdich & Ruef, 2006: 
258). However, without distinguishable 
common identity, it is very hard for an 
industry to gain legitimacy (Alrdrich & 
Fiol, 1994).
McKendrick and Carroll (2001) sug-
gested that density dependent models of 
organizational evolution need respeciﬁ-
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cation. They found support that densi-
ty does not lead to a standard form of an 
organization. Instead, they argued, that 
formal institutions are essential in the 
emergence of taken-for-granted organi-
zational forms. Similarly, on organizatio-
nal survival Aldrich and Ruef (2006: 183) 
highlight the importance of adaptation 
to institutions.
2.2 Organizational  
 legitimacy
Legitimacy in organizational contexts 
generally refers to the social acceptabi-
lity of an organization and conforman-
ce to institutional environments. Accor-
ding to Suchman (1995): “Legitimacy is 
a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some soci-
ally constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and deﬁnitions (pp. 574).” If an 
organization wishes to gain legitimacy, it 
merely needs to adopt and maintain wi-
dely used and accepted – institutionali-
zed practices (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). 
The challenge for an organization is to 
identify and absorb the particular norms, 
practices and values, which it has to res-
pect and incorporate in its operations. 
Legitimacy is considered to be an as-
set that is intangible and determines or-
ganizations’ ability to attract capital and 
personnel (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
The importance of legitimacy is then 
obvious for any organization, because 
without capital or capable personnel, it 
cannot survive in competition. The le-
gitimacy is closely linked to reputation 
that according to Rao (1994) is the out-
come of, the legitimation process. 
2.3 External legitimacy
Legitimacy most often refers to accep-
tance from outside environment (Such-
man, 1995), for example from stakehol-
ders (Mitchell et al., 1997: Aldrich & 
Ruef, 2006: 186). Aldrich & Ruef (2006: 
183) stress the importance of external 
legitimation on survival of organization. 
Cattani et al. (2008) have used the term 
audience-based legitimacy to describe 
the external environment which is the 
source of legitimacy. External environ-
ment can assist in legitimizing of organi-
zations on few ways, such as publishing 
community directories and providing 
opportunities for registration (Singh et 
al. 1986), or through certiﬁcations (Ald-
rich & Ruef, 2006: 197) and contests 
(Thompson, 1967; Rao, 1994). Also, go-
vernmental bodies, trade associations 
or professional societies may endorse 
an organization, and boost their legiti-
macy (DiMaggio, 1991; Alrdich & Ruef, 
2006: 191–3). 
Other sources of external legitimati-
on are competitors, complements, or the 
regulation, which concerns an organi-
zational population (Peltoniemi, 2011), 
and similar populations, with which the 
organization’s identity overlaps (Dobrev 
et al., 2006; Ruef, 2000). However, if an 
organization wishes to get assimilated to 
another nascent population’s identity, it 
should carefully examine that populati-
on, because the organization might get 
related to the possibly negative charac-
teristics as well. 
Singh et al. (1986) have showed that 
external legitimacy decreases the death 
rates of organizations. They also explain 
that the liability of newness in organiza-
tions results from the lack of institutio-
nal support (Singh et al., 1986). However, 
the lack of legitimacy among new inno-
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vative entrepreneurs can be reasoned by 
the fact that because their nature is not 
yet fully understood, it is unclear if their 
actions are in accordance with rules and 
practices (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Law-
rence and Phillips (2004) suggest being 
proactive when dealing with regulations. 
Especially early entrants need to be ca-
reful to follow the practices suggested by 
regulatory bodies (Lawrence & Phillips, 
2004). However, if the whole industry is 
new and still in its early stages, there may 
not yet be institutionalized rules or prac-
tices. When the regulation for this type 
of industry is written, they may follow 
the form which has been established and 
applied by a large amount of the incum-
bent organizations (Ruef, 2000).
2.4 Cognitive and  
 sociopolitical legitimacy
Legitimacy in industry contexts has been 
divided to socio-political legitimacy and 
cognitive legitimacy (Alrdich & Fiol, 
1994; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: ch. 9; Han-
nan & Carroll, 1992). According to Rao 
(1994), socio-political legitimacy refers 
to the support of legal authorities, go-
vernmental bodies, and other powerful 
organizations. Following Zucker (1986) 
and Scott (1987), cognitive legitimacy re-
fers to the assumption that an organiza-
tion is desirable, proper, and appropriate 
within a widely shared system of norms 
and values. Cognitive legitimacy is high, 
when organization is accepted as part of 
the society (Aldrich & Ruef: 2006: 186). 
These two different types of legitimacy 
have invoked interest and also critique 
among researchers. 
For starters, Zucker (1989) ques-
tioned the traditional, density-depen-
dence approach when analyzing cogni-
tive legitimacy, and suggested to seek 
for another ways to measure legitimacy. 
Similarly, Baum & Powell (1995) sugge-
sted using non-density-based alternati-
ves to analyze sociopolitical legitimacy, 
in developing institutional approach to 
organizational ecology developed. Inte-
restingly, however Hannan and Carroll 
(1995) proposed as a response to Baum 
and Powell’s suggestion, that sociopo-
litical legitimacy may not be an exoge-
nous variable, because it can also be un-
derstood as an end result for the process 
where the population is growing. Thus, 
they still defended the density-based ap-
proaches to legitimacy. Aldrich and Ruef 
(2006: 214) argue that density raises cog-
nitive legitimacy. 
Indeed, density dependence is clo-
sely linked to the number of ﬁrms, and 
cognitive legitimacy refers to the gene-
ral knowledge and understanding of the 
industry by the public audience (Alrdich 
& Fiol, 1994; Hannan & Carroll, 1992), 
or in other words stakeholders and cus-
tomers. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) suggest 
that cognitive legitimation can be me-
asured by investigating the level of pub-
lic knowledge about the industry. The-
refore, the cognitive legitimacy of an in-
dustry is free to use for all the organiza-
tions in the population.
Sociopolitical legitimacy refers to 
the acceptance from key stakeholders, 
the general public, key opinion leaders, 
or government officials, who can deﬁne if 
the organization is appropriate and right, 
given existing norms and laws (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: 186). So-
ciopolitical legitimacy could be measu-
red by analyzing the public acceptance of 
an industry, government subsidies to the 
industry, or the public prestige of its lea-
ders. Since the socio-political environ-
ment consists of formal organizations.
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2.5 Development of the 
analysis framework
For a population of organizations to sur-
vive, it needs to receive attention especi-
ally among its potential customers. The 
number of organizations is an attribute, 
which explains the amount of attention, 
that the entire population gains: The mo-
re organizations in the markets, the more 
they must ﬁght for their space, adverti-
se and approach customers. According-
ly customers begin to notice the exis-
tence of the organizational population, 
or in other words the industry. Indeed, 
customers may base their perception of 
the legitimacy of an industry to the in-
formation they receive. If the industry 
is in public and the products or services 
of the organizations are accessible, cus-
tomers are in the comprehension that 
the industry is desirable, proper and ap-
propriate. According to Alrdich and Ruef 
(2006: 214) density raises cognitive legi-
timacy. Thus, the legitimacy is based on 
the presence of the industry and its visi-
bility to its external environment.
The other type of legitimacy, thus 
socio-political legitimacy assesses the 
public acceptance as an endorsement 
from a broad set of institutions and po-
werful organizations. Alrdich and Ruef 
(2006: 185) divide socio-political legiti-
macy to moral and regulatory legitima-
cy. Accordingly, we suggest that the so-
ciopolitical measures for acceptability or 
legitimacy can be understood to include 
different levels: 
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Both can be expected to contribute 
to the legitimacy of an industry. There-
fore we name these two as regulative le-
gitimacy and social legitimacy. Table 12 
encapsulates and presents legitimacy in 
two levels. At the higher level we have the 
cognitive legitimacy and socio-political 
legitimacy (Aldich and Fiol, 1993; Ald-
rich and Ruef, 2006: 185) and at more 
detailed level we focus especially on re-
gulative legitimacy and social legitima-
cy. Based on the existing literature, we 
suggest that on an upper level, the legiti-
macy of an industry consists of cognitive 
legitimacy and socio-political legitima-
cy. Further on, the actual factors, which 
constitute the overall legitimacy of an in-
2 This framework is adapted from the Table 9.2 
in Aldrich and Ruef (2006: 185), in which they 
categorized strategies that facilitate the growth 
of new populations. In their categorization, 
sociopolitical strategies comprise moral and 
regulatory legitimacy. Cognitive strategies 
include cognitive legitimacy and learning. For the 
purposes of our study, the concept of learning is 
not included in our analysis framework.
 Cognitive legitimacy 
  
Socio-political legitimacy 
Legitimacy 
factor 
Density-based legitimacy  Regulative legitimacy  Social legitimacy 
The "presence" of firms: the 
number of firms, the 
number of customers; and 
the amount of distributed 
information on the industry 
  Industry’s compliance to the 
prevailing laws and 
regulations 
  Industry’s compliance to 
social norms and moral 
values 
Table 1. Types of legitimacy in an industry (adapted from Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Aldrich & Ruef, 2006: 185)
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dustry are density-based legitimacy, re-
gulative legitimacy, and social legitima-
cy. In structure our analysis around these 
factors, but also reﬂect on the upper level 
legitimacies.
3. Research method  
 and data
The case study methodology was ﬁrst 
described by Yin (1984, 2003) as an 
empirical research that “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident; and in which mul-
tiple sources of evidence are used.” Ei-
senhardt (1989) later deﬁned it as “a re-
search strategy which focuses on un-
derstanding the dynamics present wit-
hin single settings”. Following these, we 
chose to approach our research topic 
with the qualitative case study, because 
our research topic is very topical and in 
need of descriptive new understanding. 
Therefore the case study approach is a 
sound choice.
In our research we used the com-
bination of quantitative and qualitative 
data. Quantitative information was used 
to get a background view of the industry. 
We also used qualitative data in order to 
get enough rigorous information, which 
deepens the quantitative information 
and provides explanations for it. The da-
ta for the research was gathered in two 
ways. First, we searched the quantitative 
information about the number of payday 
loan ﬁrms, number of payday loans and 
average loan size in order to get a pro-
found understanding of the industry and 
its development in Finland. The sour-
ce for the data was Statistics Finland’s 
outstanding credit data (Tilastokeskus, 
2008–2011). The data on ﬁrm numbers, 
exits and entries is limited as there was 
no company number data prior to 2008. 
However, this data combined with the 
number of ﬁrms that had operated in the 
industry before Q3/2011 (Lainamarkki-
nat, 2011) could be used to estimate the 
entries and exits. Because of linear as-
sumptions for growth, the data is not per-
fectly accurate, but it fulﬁlls the requi-
rements set for this kind of a research.
Next, we needed to get to know the 
legitimacy, and therefore we collected 
qualitative date which we handled in the 
following steps:
1. We used data from public sources. 
We chose the most important Fin-
nish news media which have re-
leased news on payday loan industry. 
The media we chose were Helsingin 
Sanomat, Kauppalehti, Talouselä-
mä, Taloussanomat and MTV3.
2. We familiarized ourselves with the 
research topic by reading a compre-
hensive number of public materials 
in order to form an overall under-
standing on the empirical case.
3. We collected the piece of news of 
the ﬁrms into one Excel sheet with 
the information of release date, me-
dium, title, content shortened to a 
maximum of three phrases and di-
rect quotations.
4. At the same time the data gatherers 
went through the articles and pro-
vided an assessment whether the 
undertone is very negative, negati-
ve, neutral, positive or very positive 
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a scale from -2 to 2, minus meaning 
negative assessment.
5. The assessments were concealed 
so that others are able to make their 
own independent assessments wit-
hout the prior information inﬂuen-
cing on their decisions. All in all 
three assessments were made on 
each article.
The data was gathered from the time pe-
riod between 2004 – 2012 using several 
keywords (in Finnish) such as “pikavip-
pi”, “pikalaina”, “pienlaina” and most of 
their Finnish contortions. We found 196 
articles to match the search terms. The 
reason we started from 2004 was that 
we wanted to know what kinds of pub-
lic opinions there were even before the 
industry had even started in Finland. To-
day we know that the ﬁrst payday loan 
ﬁrm VIP Finland Oy started under the 
brand name of Tekstivippi on March 18th 
2005. (Ylioppilaslehti, 2010).
The goal behind assessing the dif-
ferent articles was ﬁrst of all to get to 
know to the overall legitimacy and pub-
lic opinions of the industry. Second, we 
sought to make difference between diffe-
rent years and how the legitimacy might 
have grown or decreased through time. A 
signiﬁcant part of this was to gather both 
the undertone of the articles and all the 
remarkable happenings, decisions and 
regulations of the industry in each year 
so that we could make a clear view of both 
cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy. 
To gain a deeper understanding, industry 
expert interviews could have been used. 
However, our goal was to get an outside 
view on the industry. Due to the contra-
dictory nature of the industry, the ex-
perts might have been defensive and thus 
distorted the research. Therefore we de-
cided not to use interviews.
Our results are described and dis-
cussed following the legitimacy factors 
presented in the analysis framework.
4. Results
4.1 Background: The payday 
 loan industry in Finland
As mentioned earlier, the ﬁrst ﬁrms en-
tered the payday loan industry in Fin-
land in March 2005. Helsingin Sanomat 
reported as early as October 2005 that 
Consumer Agency of Finland (Kulutta-
javirasto) is unsatisﬁed with the payday 
loan ﬁrms. The law did not order the cre-
ditors to inform the customers about the 
effective annual percentage rate of the 
loans if the loan matures within three 
months. The agency also criticized ﬁrms 
for giving loans at night. That is basical-
ly the ﬁrst negative piece of news about 
the industry, only 7 months after the in-
dustry started in Finland. At the same 
day, Helsingin Sanomat published com-
ments from a payday loan ﬁrm’s marke-
ting director, who admitted that even 
they were surprised by the increasing 
demand of such loans.
Many articles discuss high interest 
rates of the payday loans. Firms are ac-
cused of aggressive marketing, not tel-
ling the effective annual rates and cruel 
debt collecting. It is seen as a problem 
that young people are taking new loans 
to pay back the old ones. Closer to year 
2012 there is also an increasing amount 
of articles about how many payday loan 
ﬁrms are highly proﬁtable despite big 
credit defaults. Some articles are telling 
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about payday loan problems in other 
countries. In the beginning there was al-
so a problem that people could take loans 
with somebody else’s phone and name. 
There were some changes made to the 
identiﬁcation policy which handled the 
problem. The average costs for a payday 
loan have been around 26 %, meaning 
that €100 loan costs €126 for the custo-
mer on average.
According to the numbers, it is clear 
that a great part of media visibility of the 
industry is negative. However, there are 
still some slightly positive stories. The 
players in the industry are defending 
themselves by pointing out that they 
provide the only option to get small lo-
ans, since the traditional credit ﬁrms do 
not serve this need. Considering credit 
cards, many payday loan customers don’t 
have the possibility to get a credit card 
due to irregular salaries or other simi-
lar reasons. So, it can be concluded that 
the payday loan industry serves diffe-
rent customers and their products are 
different from the traditional products. 
So, there clearly is a need for this type 
of an industry. To prove this the Organi-
zation of Payday loans in Finland (Suo-
men Pienlainayhdistys) made a mystery 
shopper research. They also suggest that 
the interest payment of €30 on a €100 
should not ruin anyone’s personal ﬁnan-
ces. There are also some studies that not 
all loans go to spirits and partying, but 
people also by food and medicine with 
payday loans. 
The organization for payday loans 
in Finland is actively trying to defend 
the industry and build up the legitima-
cy. They have stated that banning the in-
dustry in Finland doesn’t help because 
the service providers would move and 
operate from other countries, where the 
legislation is more favorable for the in-
dustry. In 2007, a number of payday lo-
an ﬁrms have formed the Organization 
of Payday loans in Finland. The organi-
zation aims at developing good practi-
ces to the industry, relationships to sta-
keholders and promoting the industry, 
and improving the reputation of the in-
dustry. However, there are currently on-
ly a few dozen ﬁrms, and the majority of 
the ﬁrms – especially the smaller ones 
have not joined.
4.2 Density-based  
 legitimacy
We address density-based legitimacy 
by analyzing the “presence” of ﬁrms, in 
terms of the number of ﬁrms, and the 
development of that number, loan sizes 
and number of the loans (see Figures 1–4 
in Appendix). Regarding the number of 
ﬁrms in the industry (Figure 1) we ma-
de an assumption of linear growth befo-
re the year 2008 due to incomplete in-
formation. Overall at the end of the May 
2011 there had been 130 payday loan 
ﬁrms of which 50 had exited the industry. 
Since the opening of the markets it 
has been clear that it is easy to start a 
payday loan business. This became very 
clear after the ﬁrst business, VIP Finland 
Oy, was presented in Finnish TV in po-
sitive light and several new businesses 
was formed almost instantly (Ylioppilas-
lehti, 2010). The positive piece of news 
built cognitive legitimacy for the whole 
industry which was then only to be chan-
ged into negative. Nonetheless, the num-
ber of ﬁrms has grown largely because of 
easiness and simplicity of the business 
model, which has helped to increase the 
density-based legitimacy as well. We can 
say that the industry has had low barriers 
of entry.
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In addition to the growth in the num-
ber of ﬁrms, the average loan size (Figure 
3), number of new loans (Figure 2) and 
ﬁnancial amount of payday loans alto-
gether (Figure 4) have increased steadily 
since the establishment of the industry. 
This reinforces the conception that cog-
nitive and density-based legitimacy have 
been spreading and growing. At the end 
of 2011, over €80 million was taken as 
payday loan per quarter year. Due to the 
small size of loans, this means over 350 
000 new loans in every three months.
Another way to look at the densi-
ty-based legitimacy is to examine how 
much news articles there has been in dif-
ferent media and how much the reporta-
ge has grown during the lifespan of the 
industry. The number of news (see Table 
5 in Appendix) in the Internet media (see 
chap.3) has been growing the whole time 
during the industry’s existence, and the 
tipping point was reached in 2008 when 
news articles more than doubled. 
4.3 Sociopolitical legitimacy
Social legitimacy
An interesting part of the whole discussi-
on here is how media obviously has been 
trying to defame the whole industry wit-
hout much of an effect in the revenues of 
the ﬁrms. It seems that there is a serio-
us demand for payday loans even though 
the public discussion refuses to admit it. 
As discussed before, legitimacy refers to 
social acceptance from the stakeholders 
and outside environment. According to 
our analysis, (Figure 6), the social accep-
tance has been negative almost throug-
hout the history of the industry. This 
fact is contrary to the supposition that 
legitimacy creates fertile foundation for 
growth and attracts more players to the 
industry. On the other hand it may be 
that Finnish payday loan ﬁrms are still 
in short of capital and employees and the 
industry would be even larger if the legi-
timacy was stronger. 
Indeed social legitimacy is in the 
worst shape when compared to other 
kinds of legitimacy. There has been litt-
le or no support from government or any 
other legal authorities. The organizati-
on of Payday loans in Finland was foun-
ded in 2007 but gained publicity not un-
til 2011 after which there has been ma-
ny statements by the organization in dif-
ferent media. This union is the biggest 
foray of payday loan ﬁrms to build their 
social and regulative legitimacy. The pre-
sence of the organization has channeled 
to more positive news about the industry 
in 2012 where there is huge increase in 
the assessments compared to 2011. Des-
pite the efforts by the organization the 
overall reputation of the industry is bad, 
based on our analysis.
Regulative legitimacy
Since the industry emerged in 2005 the-
re have been many changes in legislati-
on regarding payday loans. Members of 
parliament and consumer agency have 
demanded stricter regulation for the in-
dustry. 
Payday loans were discussed in Fin-
nish Parliament in fall 2006 and many 
members of parliament insisted rest-
rictions to payday loans, especially to 
times when loans are granted. Ministry 
of Justice set a working group to give a 
legislation proposal about payday loans 
in October 2007. Also the Finnish Police 
made an investigation about payday lo-
ans in Finland. They stated that it is not 
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criminal business, and didn’t consider it 
to be usury. 
The Market Court of Finland deci-
ded in June 2009 to prohibit payday lo-
an ﬁrms to transfer money to customer’s 
account before 07.00 if the loan was ta-
ken after 23.00. In July 2009 The Mar-
ket Court prohibited advertising payday 
loans by highlighting how fast the money 
gets into customer’s account. The new 
law about payday loans became valid in 
January 2010. It insists creditors to tell 
the effective annual rate for every loan. 
It also forbids creditors to give loans and 
transfer money to consumers between 
23.00 and 07.00.
Next important change in legislation 
was a law in December 2010. It requires 
all creditors to register before June 2011 
to Creditor Register managed by Regio-
nal State Administrative agency of Sout-
hern Finland (Etelä-Suomen aluehallin-
tavirasto). 
In September 2011 there began a 
discussion in Finnish Parliament that 
should all payday loans be prohibited by a 
law. In December 116 out of 200 of mem-
bers in Finnish parliament were ready to 
prohibit payday loans completely. Sec-
retary of Justice stated 13.12.2011 that 
payday loans cannot totally be banned 
due to Finnish laws of freedom of living 
and occupation.
Helsingin Sanomat reported on 
March 2012 that there are two legislati-
ve proposals about payday loans in Fin-
nish parliaments. One insists banning 
the whole industry, and the other insists 
only more restrictions.
To sum up all legislative changes re-
garding payday loans, the legislation is 
getting stricter. New laws and court de-
cisions have had some effect to the pro-
cesses and policies of the industry. Re-
gistration of the ﬁrms is beneﬁcial for the 
industry, because it might assist building 
up both social and regulatory legitimacy. 
Despite the compulsory of registration 
and limits to marketing and lending ti-
mes the total number of ﬁrms has been 
increasing. Exits from the industry are 
more a result of tight competition than 
tightened legislation. The Organizati-
on of Payday loans in Finland is clearly 
trying to build up social- and regulatory 
legitimacy. The higher barriers of entry 
by legislation only make the markets mo-
re attractive for the organization’s cur-
rent member ﬁrms. 
Table 2. Diﬀerent types of legitimacies in Finnish payday loan industry
Cognitive legitimacy Socio-Political legitimacy 
Density-based legitimacy Regulative legitimacy Social legitimacy 
- ow barriers of entry 
- igh growth in density 
since the beginning of the 
industry 
- The industry and the 
number of firms is still 
growing 
- According to the current 
legislation, the payday loan 
business is not forbidden 
- egislation is still changing 
and taking shape 
- There are two legislative 
proposals on the table, that can 
have significant impact on 
regulative legislation 
- edia’s writing about the 
industry has been negative  
ensity-based legitimacy is 
high. 
Regulative legitimacy is high, 
but expected to decrease if the 
legislation tightens up. 
ocial legitimacy is low 
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The two current legislative pro-
posals will probably determine the regu-
latory legitimacy. Banning the industry 
is not very probable, and it could drive 
ﬁrms to operate from some other count-
ry. The other proposal would regulate the 
industry more than current legislation. It 
would set clear rules how ﬁrms should 
operate. After those changes it would be 
harder to judge payday loan ﬁrms if they 
are operating within new legislation that 
parliament had just set. This should also 
improve social legitimacy little bit.
Following the analysis framework 
presented in the literature synthesis, 
Table 2 highlights the ﬁndings on the 
different types of legitimacy studied in 
the data, and suggests evaluations on 
the state of different types of legitimacy 
of the Finnish payday loan industry. Ac-
cording to our analysis, the cognitive and 
density-based legitimacy of the Finnish 
payday loan industry is high; the regula-
tive legitimacy is still high, but expected 
to diminish, if the legislation tightens 
and the social legitimacy is low.
5. Discussion
Our research results showed that the 
cognitive and density-based legitimacy 
of the payday loan industry is high. The 
growth of the industry has been rather 
rapid considering both the number of 
ﬁrms and the number or value of granted 
loans. There are quite a lot of ﬁrms and 
customers in the industry, so the densi-
ty is high. This also means that cognitive 
and density-based legitimacy has grown 
and has reached a rather high level in this 
industry. 
Regulative legitimacy is also high, 
meaning that the industry operates ac-
cording to existing laws. Sociopolitical 
legitimacy has been said to arise from 
the support of for example legal autho-
rities (Rao, 1994; Alrdich & Ruef, 2006: 
191–3). According to our ﬁndings, the 
payday loan industry has received quite 
judgmental statements from the autho-
rities, which in its part has weakened the 
industry’s legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the high growth rates 
in the industry have not contributed to 
growth in socio-political legitimacy. Ac-
cording to existing literature on ecology, 
new entrants should have increased le-
gitimacy (Lange et al., 2009). In terms of 
cognitive legitimacy, it seems true. Ho-
wever, the emergence and growth of the 
industry has decreased socio-political 
legitimacy which is seen in the assess-
ment of news written about the payday 
loan industry. 
Of the three different types of legi-
timacy that we assessed, we conclude 
that the one with lowest levels is social 
legitimacy. Even though the ﬁrms act ac-
cording to the law, they might still vio-
late social rules and norms. In Finland, 
taking advantage of the less advantaged 
is deﬁnitely not considered acceptable, 
even if the law would have loopholes to 
allow it. Thus the payday loan industry 
does not follow the institutional norms 
in the society (Cf. Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991). Therefore the situation in the in-
dustry is quite the opposite than what is 
stated in existing literature. Social legi-
timacy is decreasing, but the number of 
ﬁrms is increasing and ﬁnancially the in-
dustry seems to ﬂourish. 
Similarly, the number of customers 
is high and growing even though social 
acceptance is low. Thus, the public repu-
tation of the industry seems to be wor-
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se than the opinion of the customers to 
the payday loan ﬁrms. However, the cus-
tomers of the payday loan industry con-
sider the industry as legitimate and ac-
ceptable, if deduced from the observati-
on that the customers use increasingly 
the products of the industry. External 
stakeholders, such as regulators and aut-
horities however, consider the industry 
illegitimate and socially not acceptable. 
This supports the view, that sociopoliti-
cal legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) as a 
term is troublesome since it includes two 
different legitimacies: Legitimacy from 
regulatory, law-based establishments; 
and legitimacy from the public opinion.
The literature describes legitima-
cy as collective good, which is freely ac-
cessible to any organization in the in-
dustry (Rao, 1994). However, it seems 
that one ﬁrm not behaving according 
to the rules or some customers comp-
laining about one ﬁrm could affect the 
reputation of the entire industry. Firms 
that are trying to behave according to the 
rules might not be able to ﬁght against 
this halo effect. The industry in our study 
has tried to ﬁght against this effect by es-
tablishing a register for ”well-behaving 
ﬁrms”, which could then act as a legiti-
mizing category or a standard, similarly 
as suggested by Singh et al. (1986). On the 
other hand, all ﬁrms in the industry ha-
ve basically the same form, so being able 
to say which ﬁrm exploits its customers 
the least might be impossible, as the le-
gitimacy is collective good (Rao, 1994). 
The industry is doing ﬁnancially ex-
tremely good; growth has been and will 
likely continue to be rapid. Still, especial-
ly social legitimacy is poor. This may re-
sult from the fact, that social legitimacy 
is not always necessary for the industry 
to survive. There still seems to be a par-
ticular segment, the customers that want 
to use payday loan services and consider 
the industry as legitimate. Customers 
need the payday loan ﬁrms and want to 
use their services. Regulative legitima-
cy is also an important factor in this in-
dustry due to legislation that has been 
changing and might change in the futu-
re. There is even a possibility of banning 
the whole industry.
6. Conclusions
Based on our research, the legitimacy of 
an industry is consists of different fac-
tors. Density-based, cognitive legitima-
cy is the traditional, ecological approach 
to legitimacy, and refers to the presen-
ce of an industry; and its ﬁrms, and the 
overall the size of the industry, the num-
ber of ﬁrms and customers. Our ﬁndings 
support the view, that sociopolitical le-
gitimacy should be divided in two dis-
tinct factors. First, regulative legitima-
cy, which refers to the industry’s confor-
mance with legislation and regulations. 
Second, social legitimacy, which refers 
to the general perception whether the in-
dustry is “good” or “bad” for the society. 
In general, we can suggest that even 
though an industry has density-based le-
gitimacy, it might still not have social le-
gitimacy. Also, even though an industry 
has regulative legitimacy, it still might 
not have social legitimacy. So, only re-
gulative legitimacy, not social legitima-
cy, is required to pursue density-based 
legitimacy. An industry can ﬁnd custo-
mers without common social acceptan-
ce if there is a true need for the products 
or services. 
Our research has some managerial 
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implications. Companies in the payday 
loan industry can beneﬁt from our rese-
arch by acknowledging the importance 
of different types of legitimacy. In some 
situations it may not be necessary to ha-
ve high social legitimacy, and thus ﬁrms 
don’t need to try acquiring it. For ﬁrms, 
regulative legitimacy is not that easy to 
affect. Regulation doesn’t change that of-
ten, but when it does, risks are huge. The 
worst case scenario for payday loan com-
panies would be that the whole industry 
gets banned when the laws are changed. 
Even though the ﬁrms are of our stu-
dy are making quite good proﬁts, they 
could perform even better if they could 
affect social legitimacy. The register is a 
good start, but even more could be done. 
The ﬁrms could affect the public opinion 
and social legitimacy by proactively ad-
vising customers through different kind 
of advertising or clarifying the terms of 
loans to potential customers.
This research has four limitations, 
each however opening up avenues for 
further research. First, because we ana-
lyzed only one industry, a similar rese-
arch approach could be used to study ot-
her legitimacy-wise “controversial” in-
dustries, such as the tobacco, alcohol or 
adult entertainment industries, in order 
to validate our ﬁndings. Second, as the 
payday loan industry has been in Finland 
for a fairly short time period, follow-up 
research would show if our ﬁndings still 
hold, when the industry matures. Third, 
further research could complement this 
study with additional data from other 
sources such as interviews and surveys 
on public opinion. Fourth, this research 
is limited to one country, and because 
country speciﬁc factors such as legisla-
tion and culture often have large impact 
on business, research on the payday loan 
industry in another country would provi-
de opportunities for comparisons.
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Figure 1. The number of payday loan ﬁrms in 2005-2011.
Figure 2. The number of new loans in 2008-2011.
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Figure 3. The average loan sizes in 2008–2011.
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Figure 4. New loans and amount of payday loans in 2008-2011.
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